California Regulates Pseudo-Foreign Corporations - Trampling upon the Tramp by Oldham, J. Thomas
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 17 | Number 1 Article 3
1-1-1977
California Regulates Pseudo-Foreign Corporations
- Trampling upon the Tramp
J. Thomas Oldham
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
J. Thomas Oldham, California Regulates Pseudo-Foreign Corporations - Trampling upon the Tramp, 17 Santa Clara L. Rev. 85 (1977).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol17/iss1/3
CALIFORNIA REGULATES PSEUDO-FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS-TRAMPLING UPON THE
TRAMP?
J. Thomas Oldham*
It is very true that a corporation can have no legal
existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which
it is created. . . . It must dwell in the place of its creation,
and cannot migrate to another sovereignty.'
* INTRODUCTION
Anglo-American courts have traditionally applied the in-
ternal affairs doctrine to resolve choice of law problems involv-
ing foreign corporations.' The internal affairs doctrine requires
that the law of the state of incorporation be applied to ques-
tions regarding the internal affairs3 of a corporation. However,
a recent amendment to the California Corporations Code pro-
vides for a substantially different choice of law approach re-
* B.A., 1970, Denison University; J.D., 1974, U.C.L.A.; Member of the California
Bar.
1. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839) (Taney, C.J.).
2. For a summary of the views of the early American commentators regarding
the law applicable to corporations with multi-state contacts, see generally 1 J. DAVIS,
ESSAYS IN THE EARLY HISTORY OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS (1905); G. HENDERSON, THE
POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW chs. 1-11 (1918);
E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, A COMPARATIVE STUDY ch. 19 (2d ed. 1958); Baldwin,
American Business Corporations Before 1786, 8 AM. HIST. REV. 449 (1903).
3. Examples of corporate internal affairs include the duties and liabilities of
directors, the proper procedure for electing them, the enforceability of by-laws or
articles, and the proper procedure for holding directors' and shareholders' meetings.
Courts have disagreed as to what constitutes a question involving the "internal
affairs" of a corporation, and the scope of this question has sometimes been severely
limited by courts wishing to apply local law to a question involving a foreign corpora-
tion. See, e.g., Toklan Royalty Corp. v. Tiffany, 9 Okla. 120, 141 P.2d 571 (1943). This
definition suggested in an early case has been widely accepted:
[Wihere the act complained of affects the complainant solely in his
capacity as a member of the corporation, whether it be as stockholder,
director, president, or other officer, and is the act of the corporation,
whether acting in stockholders' meeting, or through its agents, the board
of directors then such action is the management of the internal affairs of
the corporation ...
North State Copper & Gold Mining Co. v. Field, 64 Md. 151, 154, 20 A. 1039, 1040
(1885). The drafters of the Restatement (Second) suggested this definition: "JAI
corporation's internal affairs are involved whenever the issue concerns the relations
inter se of the corporation, its stockholders, directors, officers or agents." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 313, Comment a at 347 (1971).
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garding the activities of pseudo-foreign corporations.'
This article examines California's departure under section
2115 ' from the traditional approach to choice of law questions
involving corporations with multi-state contacts. It includes a
discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the internal af-
fairs doctrine and the judicial efforts to circumvent its applica-
tion to pseudo-foreign corporations. The social costs of the ap-
plication of the internal affairs doctrine will be examined in
light of differences between California's corporate laws and
those of New York and Delaware, where many California
pseudo-foreign corporations are incorporated. Due to the differ-
ences among the corporate laws of the states, the application
of the internal affairs doctrine has induced corporations to
avoid incorporating in states with restrictive laws and to inco-
porate in less-restrictive states such as Delaware, taking their
charter fees and franchise taxes with them. Thus, the applica-
tion of the internal affairs doctrine to pseudo-foreign corpora-
tions imposes financial costs upon the forum state as well as
social costs. This, in turn, has had a Gresham's Law effect on
restrictive states, causing them to abandon their statutory
schemes in order to successfully compete for corporate charter
fees and franchise taxes.
The article also analyzes the constitutional limitations
upon choice of law and evaluates the merit of constitutional
challenges to section 2115. Finally, in light of the above, poten-
tial problems in the application of section 2115 will be dis-
cussed.
CALIFORNIA CORPORATIONS CODE SECTION 2115
Section 2115 represents an accommodation of the interests
of pseudo-foreign corporations and the interests of California.
It promotes the certainty of regulation desired by pseudo-
foreign corporations in order to facilitate their corporate plan-
ning, and it advances the social policies of California by requir-
ing that pseudo-foreign corporations conduct their internal af-
fairs pursuant to California law rather than the law of the state
of incorporation.
The new California Corporations Code defines pseudo-
foreign corporations as those corporations incorporated in an-
other state but whose principal place of business is California
4. Such foreign corporations have pejoratively been characterized as "tramp"
corporations. A corporation which has minimal contacts with its state of incorporation
and which derives a majority of its revenue within the forum will be referred to herein
as a "pseudo-foreign" corporation.
5. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 641, § 32.5, at 1673-75 (amending CAL. CoaP. CODE
[Vol. 17
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and a majority of whose shareholders have California domi-
ciles. Section 2115(a) provides that selected internal affairs of
a pseudo-foreign corporation will be governed by provisions of
the California Corporations Code to the exclusion of the law of
the state of incorporation' when it is ascertained from the
officers' certificate, filed pursuant to section 2108, that: (1)
the average of its property, payroll and sales factors7 (as those
terms are defined in sections 25129, 8 25132' and 25134,'" respec-
tively, of the California Revenue and Taxation Code) exceeds
50 percent during its latest full "income" year and (2) more
than one-half of its outstanding voting securities are held of
record" by persons having addresses" in California. 3 If these
§ 2115). All statutory references in this article, unless otherwise indicated, are to the
CAL. CORP. CODE (West Supp. 1976).
6. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 641, § 32.5, at 1674 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE §
2115(b)). It should be noted that these provisions apply "to the exclusion of the law of
the state of incorporation." Id. This provision does not specifically proscribe the appli-
cation of the law of a third state in such a situation. For example, if a director was a
domiciliary of a third state, and that director took certain corporate action in that state
which caused harm to a resident of that state, it could be argued that the law of that
state should govern the director's standard of care.
7. These "factors" basically represent the respective percentage of a corpora-
tion's property, payroll and sales attributable to California. For an extensive discussion
of these factors. See generally R. BOCK, GUIDEBOOK TO CALIFORNIA TAXES 316-17 (1974);
Comment, California's New General Corporation Law: Quasi-Foreign Corporations, 7
PAC. L.J. 673, 688-91 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Quasi-Foreign
Corporations].
8. The property factor is defined as
a fraction, the numerator of which is the average of the taxpayer's real
and tangible personal property owned or rented and used in this state
during the income year, and the denominator of which is the average
value of the taxpayer's real and tangible personal property owned or
rented and used during the income year.
CAL. REV. & Tax. Code § 25129 (West 1970).
9. The payroll factor is defined as "a fraction, the numerator of which is the total
amount paid in this state during the income year by the taxpayer for compensation,
and the denominator of which is the total compensation paid everywhere during the
income year." Id. § 25132.
10. The sales factor is defined as "a fraction, the numerator of which is the total
sales of the taxpayer in this state during the income year, and the denominator of
which is the sales of the taxpayer everywhere during the income year." Id. § 25134.
11. Any securities known by the issuer to be held in the name of a broker, dealer
or its nominee are not considered outstanding for purposes of this section. 1976 Cal.
Legis. Serv., ch. 641, § 32.5, at 1673-74 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(a)).
12. This refers to the addresses of the shareholders as of the last record date for
a shareholder's meeting. Id. § 30.4, at 1671 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 2108(a)(1)).
It is not clear what it means to "have an address" in California. Presumably, this term
refers to the principal address of a shareholder according to the records of the corpora-
tion. See also CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25103(b), (c), (d) (West Supp. 1976).
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requirements are met, the laws of the pseudo-foreign corpora-
tion's state of incorporation will be supplanted by provisions of
California law dealing with shareholder rights,'4 director and
officer conduct and liability,' shareholder distributions," cor-
porate reorganizations and dissenters' rights, 7 and other provi-
sions which relate to corporate internal affairs.'8 Corporations
with securities listed on a national securities exchange 9 are
13. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 641, § 32.5, at 1673-74 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 2115(a)). This information is disclosed in the section 2108 certificate. See text accom-
panying note 22 infra. It should be emphasized that these tests are conjunctive. A
corporation that does business only in California but a majority of whose outstanding
voting shares are held by persons having addresses outside of California would not be
governed by section 2115.
14. Section 2115(b) expressly provides that the following sections of the new code
regarding shareholders' rights are applicable to pseudo-foreign corporations: section
301 (annual election of directors); section 303 (removal of a director without cause by
the shareholders); section 304 (removal of a director for certain proscribed acts pur-
suant to court proceedings instituted by the shareholders); section 305(c) (filling di-
rector vacancies where less than a majority of the directors then in office were elected
by the shareholders); sections 600(b) and (c) (requirement of an annual shareholders'
meeting); sections 708(a), (b) and (c) (each shareholder's right to cumulate votes at
any election of directors). Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 641, § 32.5, at 1674 (amending CAL.
CORP. CODE § 2115(b)).
15. Section 2115(b) expressly provides that the following sections of the new code
regarding director and officer conduct and liability are applicable to pseudo-foreign
corporations: section 309 (director's standard of care); section 316 (liability of a direc-
tor for unlawful distributions), excluding subdivisions (a)(3) and (f)(3); section 317
(indemnification by the corporation of a director, officer or others). Id.
16. Section 2115(b) expressly provides that the following sections of the new code
regarding shareholder distributions are applicable to pseudo-foreign corporations: sec-
tions 500-05 (limitations on corporate distributions to its shareholders); section 506
(liability of a shareholder who receives an unlawful distribution). Id.
17. Section 2115(b) expressly provides that the following sections and chapters
of the new code regarding corporate reorganizations and dissenters' rights are appli-
cable to pseudo-foreign corporations: section 1001(d) (limitation upon "freezing out"
minority shareholders pursuant to a sale of assets); section 1101, the text following
subdivision (e) (limitations upon "freezing out" minority shareholders pursuant to a
merger); chapter 12 (commencing with section 1200) (reorganizations); chapter 13
(commencing with section 1300) (dissenters' rights). Id.
18. Section 2115(b) expressly provides that the following sections and chapters
of the new code regarding other aspects of corporate internal affairs are applicable to
pseudo-foreign corporations: sections 1500-01 (corporate books and records and reports
to shareholders); section 1508 (enforcement action by the California Attorney Gen-
eral); chapter 16 (commencing with section 1600) (shareholder's right of inspection).
Id.
19. Id. at 1675 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(e)). Only stocks listed on an
exchange certified by the California Commissioner of Corporations under section
25100(o) are exempt. The Commissioner has certified the New York Stock Exchange
and American Stock Exchange pursuant to this section. It should also be noted that
section 2115(e) expressly exempts those corporations whose voting shares (other than
directors' qualifying shares) are entirely owned (directly or indirectly) by an exempted
corporation. Id.
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expressly exempted from section 2115.20
Pursuant to section 2105(a), a foreign corporation must
qualify with the California Secretary of State before it trans-
acts intra-state business in California." Section 2108 requires
that after January 1, 1977, any foreign corporation qualified to
transact intra-state business in California must annually file
within three months and fifteen days after the close of its "in-
come year" an "officers' certificate."'2 The certificate must be
filed regarding "income years" ending on or after December 31,
1976.23
The officers' certificate must set forth: 1) the percentage
of its outstanding voting securities held as of the record date
for the last shareholders' meeting by persons "having addresses
in California" (excluding shares held in the name of broker,
dealer or its nominee), and 2) its "property, payroll and sales
factors," both requirements to be computed pursuant to sec-
tion 2115(a). 4 If the section 2108 officers' certificate is not filed
with the Secretary of State within six months after notice that
such a filing is delinquent, the Secretary "shall forfeit the right
of that corporation to transact intra-state business" in Califor-
nia. 5 The Secretary of State is required to mail a section 2108
certificate form to each foreign corporation qualified to trans-
act intrastate business in time reasonably sufficient for such a
corporation to comply, but neither the failure of the Secretary
of State to mail such a form nor the failure of the corporation
20. Section 2115(e) provides an exemption for "any corporation with outstanding
securities listed on any national securities exchange .. " Id. This section applies to
a corporation with any outstanding securities so listed; it does not appear necessary
that all of these corporation's outstanding securities be so listed. The same rule ap-
plies regarding New York's similar regulatory scheme. See Baraf, The Foreign Corpo-
ration-A Problem in Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 33 BROOKLYN L. REv. 219 (1967) [here-
inafter cited as Barafi.
21. Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2102 (West Supp. 1976) (a foreign corporation which
designated an agent for service of process prior to Jan. 1, 1977, need not file a section
2105 statement, but shall file an amended statement and designation when required
by section 2107).
22. Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 641, § 30.4, at 1671-72 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE §
2108). "Officers' certificate" is defined in CAL. CORP. CODE § 173 (West Supp. 1976).
23. Certain foreign parent corporations must also file such reports pursuant to
section 2108(a) and section 2115. Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 641, § 30.4, at 1671-72 (amend-
ing CAL. CORP. CODE § 2108(a)); Id. § 32.5 at 1673 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE §
2115(a)). This provision was added so that a pseudo-foreign corporation could not
circumvent section 2115 by conducting its business via a subsidiary. It should be noted
that New York's analogous provisions regarding pseudo-foreign corporations do not
encompass pseudo-foreign parent corporations. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1320 (McKin-
ney 1963).
24. Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 641, § 30.4, at 1671-72 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE §
2108(a)).
25. Id. at 1672 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 2108(d)).
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to receive it is an excuse for a failure to comply with section
2108.11
If the officers' certificate, filed pursuant to section 2108,
shows that the corporation's California contacts satisfy the sec-
tion 2115(a) two-pronged test, the provisions of the new code
enumerated in section 2115(b) apply to that foreign corporation
as of the first day of the corporation's first income year which
commences at least thirty days after the date of filing of the
officers' certificate.27 A foreign corporation ceases to be gov-
erned by the provisions enumerated in section 2115(b) at the
end of any income year during which either the officers' certifi-
cate shows that the corporation no longer meets the section
2115(a) tests or an order is entered by a court which declares
that the tests are not met.2"
Section 2115 generally requires that foreign corporations
which maintain their commercial domiciles in California be
governed by California law. The section attempts to insure that
the social policies of California, as manifested in its corpora-
tions code, will no longer be circumvented by such corpora-
tions pursuant to the internal affairs doctrine.
CIRCUMVENTING THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE
The Internal Affairs Doctrine
To resolve choice of law questions regarding foreign corpo-
rations in the absence of a statute such as section 2115,29 courts
26. Of course, the Secretary of State must send the delinquent filing notice. Id.
(amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 2108(b)).
27. Id. § 32.5, at 1674 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(c)). This section also
indicates that the sections enumerated in section 2115(b) would govern the internal
affairs of those foreign corporations "upon the entry of an order by a court declaring
that [the section 2115(a) test has] been met." It is not clear whether those sections
would govern the internal affairs of such a corporation immediately after the entry of
such an order, or upon the first day of the first fiscal year which would commence at
least 30 days after the entry of such an order.
28. Id. at 1674-75 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 2115(d)).
29. There are constitutional provisions or statutes in a majority of states which
generally provide that foreign corporations shall be treated in the same manner as
domestic ones. Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137, 156 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as Latty I]. Although it could be argued that such "equal treat-
ment" provisions subject all foreign corporations transacting local business to local
corporation law, such provisions have rarely been so construed. See Kaplan, Foreign
Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REV. 433, 471 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Kaplanl; Latty I, supra, at 157; Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing
Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM.
[Vol. 17
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have traditionally applied the internal affairs doctrine." It pro-
vides that the law of the forum may be applied to questions
regarding the external affairs3 of a corporation, but the law of
the state of incorporation must be applied to questions regard-
ing the internal affairs" of a corporation.
The internal affairs doctrine is a creature of the vested
rights approach to choice of law questions. This approach geo-
graphically conceptualizes the rights of parties resulting from
a transaction or occurrence with multi-state contacts. The
rights of parties are said to vest in the place where they are
created. The law of that state must then be applied to govern
those rights, regardless where an action upon them is brought.33
L. REV. 1118, 1118 n.1 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Reese & Kaufman].
30. It should be noted that under the traditional approach no distinction is
customarily made between genuine foreign corporations and pseudo-foreign corpora-
tions. A pseudo-foreign corporation has been recognized as a validly formed corporate
entity, and the law of its state of incorporation traditionally has been applied to
questions regarding its internal affairs. See, e.g., Lancaster v. Amsterdam Improve-
ment Co., 140 N.Y. 576, 35 N.E. 964 (1894); Demarest v. Flack, 128 N.Y. 205, 28 N.E.
645 (1891); Nicholson v. Franklin Brewing Co., 82 Ohio St. 94, 91 N.E. 991 (1910);
Cochran v. Shetler, 286 Pa. 226, 133 A. 232 (1926). But see Hill v. Beach, 12 N.J. Eq.
31 (Ch. 1858). See generally Latty I, supra note 29, at 145-48.
31. Examples of corporate external affairs include the execution of contracts, the
commission of torts, the sale of securities, and the conveyance of property. See, e.g.,
Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stockyards
Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Commonwealth
Acceptance Corp. v. Jordan, 198 Cal. 618, 246 P. 796 (1926); Miles v. Woodward, 115
Cal. 308, 46 P. 1076 (1896); North State Copper & Gold Mining Co. v. Field, 64 Md.
151, 20 A. 1039 (1885). See generally Baraf, supra note 20, at 235; Hohfeld, The
Individual Liability of Stockholders and the Conflict of Laws, 10 COLUM. L. REV. 283-
87 (1910); Latty I, supra note 29, at 143; Reese & Kaufman, supra note 29, at 1120-28;
Note, Forum Non Conveniens as a Substitute for the Internal Affairs Rule, 58 COLUM.
L. REV. 234 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Note, Forum Non Conveniens]; Note, The
Development of the "Internal Affairs" Rule in the Federal Courts and Its Future Under
Erie v. Tompkins, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 413 (1946); Note, Conflict of Laws: Local Law
Applied to Shareholders' Rights in Foreign Corporations, 1962 DUKE L.J. 109, 110
[hereinafter cited as Note, Local Law and Shareholders' Rights]; Note, Conflict of
Laws: Elimination of Cumulative Voting by Foreign Corporation Held Subject to
Forum State's Blue Sky Laws, 46 MINN. L. REV. 785, 787-88 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Voting and Blue Sky Laws]; Note, Corporations: Sale of Securities, 9
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 242 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Note, Sale of Securities]; Note, The
"Internal Affairs" Doctrine in State Courts, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 666 (1949) [hereinafter
cited as Note, I.A.D. in State Courts].
32. See note 3 supra.
33. See generally Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d 9, 203
N.E.2d 210 (1964); H. GOODRICH, CONFLICr OF LAWS §§ 11, 14 (4th ed. 1964).
Some courts have refused to apply the law dictated by the vested rights approach
if that law would violate a "fundamental policy" of the forum. See, e.g., Hausman v.
Buckley, 299 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1972). See also Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-
92 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17
Under the vested rights approach, the general nature of the
action is first "characterized" (as e.g., a "torts" or a "contract"
action). A choice of law rule (connecting factor) has evolved for
each general type of action; all choice of law questions of the
same type of action are treated in the same manner. Once the
nature of an action is characterized, the application of the
appropriate connecting factor leads to the state where the
rights of the parties vested and the laws of that state govern
substantive questions presented by the action. For example, all
tort questions are governed by the law of the state where the
alleged wrong occurred. Questions concerning the internal af-
fairs of a corporation have traditionally been decided by refer-
ence to the corporations code of the state of incorporation, since
the rights and duties regarding such affairs were said to vest
there.34
Law Problem, 47 HAnv. L. REV. 173, 183 (1933); Nussbaum, Public Policy and the
Political Crisis in the Conflict of Laws, 49 YALE L.J. 1027, 1031 (1940); Paulsen &
Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969 (1956). Pro-
fessors Paulsen and Sovern stated that" 'public policy' is one way to avoid the applica-
tion of a choice of law rule which the forum wishes to avoid." Id. at 981.
The Supreme Court has stated that this exception also applies to statutes which
would otherwise be entitled to full faith and credit. For example, the Court made this
statement in Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 507 (1941):
"Where this Court has required the state of the forum to apply the foreign
law under the full faith and credit clause or under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, it has recognized that a state is not required to enforce a law
obnoxious to its public policy."
See also Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
34. Many courts initially regarded the internal affairs doctrine as a jurisdictional
limit. Courts have stated that a local court would not exercise "visitorial powers" over
the management of a foreign corporation. See North State Copper & Gold Mining Co.
v. Field, 64 Md. 151, 20 A. 1039 (1885); Annot., 8 A.L.R. 2d 1185 (1949); Latty I, supra
note 29, at 143; Note, Local Law and Shareholders' Rights, supra note 31, at 110.
Courts in most jurisdictions now decide whether to dismiss an action regarding the
internal affairs of a foreign corporation in accordance with the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. See Williams v. Green Bay & W. Ry., 326 U.S. 549 (1946); Rogers v.
Guarantee Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933); Lonergan v. Crucible Steel Co. of America,
37 Ill. 2d 599, 299 N.E. 2d 536 (1967); Weede v. Iowa S. Util. Co., 231 Iowa 784, 2
N.W.2d 372 (1942); Travis v. Knox Terpezon, Co., 215 N.Y. 259, 109 N.E. 250 (1915);
Latty I, supra note 29, at 144; Note, Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 31; Note,
Forum Non Conveniens in the Internal Affairs of a Foreign Corporation, 33 COLUM. L.
REv. 492 (1933); Note, Local Law and Shareholders' Rights, supra note 31, at 111;
Comment, Internal Affairs Rule in the Federal Courts-The Erie Problem, 115 U. PA.
L. REV. 973 (1967); Note, I.A.D. in State Courts, supra note 31.
The Illinois Supreme Court summarized the modern view in this manner:
In early cases the acceptance or denial of jurisdiction of derivative
actions against foreign corporations turned on what the courts deter-
mined was or was not interference with the internal affairs of the corpora-
tion. . . . We feel that the acceptance or denial of jurisdiction of such
actions should be decided under the doctrine of forum non conveniens
and that interference with the internal affairs of a foreign corporation is
PSEUDO-FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
Judicial Circumvention
Of course, the vested rights approach is only one of the
various doctrines which may be utilized to resolve conflict of
laws problems. By employing a different approach courts have
been able to circumvent the internal affairs doctrine, thus ena-
bling them to apply their own law to issues affecting the inter-
nal affairs of a foreign corporation. Courts have accomplished
circumvention primarily by manipulating the characterization
of the issue under the vested rights approach" or by adopting
either the Restatement approach or the governmental interest
analysis approach to conflict of laws problems. The Restate-
ment approach requires that the law of the state which has the
most significant relationship with the subject matter in issue
should be applied." On the other hand, governmental interest
analysis focuses on the respective policies underlying the laws
of the competing jurisdictions, and requires that the law of the
jurisdiction whose underlying policy would be advanced by the
application of its law, in view of the contacts between the par-
ties and the competing jurisdictions, should be the law which
governs the issue.37
Courts manipulating the characterization of an issue
under the vested rights approach have held, for example, that
questions regarding the inspection rights of shareholders in
pseudo-foreign corporations either do not involve the internal
only one factor in determining whether an Illinois court would serve the
convenience of the parties and the ends of justice.
Lonergan v. Crucible Co. of America, 37 11. 2d 599, 605, 229 N.E.2d 536, 539 (1967).
35. Characterization is basically the classification of facts to fit broad estab-
lished categories of law such as tort or contract. See A. ROBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION
IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1940); Cook, "Characterization" in the Conflict of Laws, 51
YALE L.J. 191 (1941); Cormack, Renvoi, Characterization and Preliminary Questions
in the Conflict of Laws, 14 S. CAL. L. REV. 221 (1941); Morse, Characterization:
Shadow or Substance, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 1027 (1949).
The discussion of characterization was introduced in this country in Lorengen,
The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 247 (1920).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6, at 10 (1971). While the cases
to be discussed pre-date the Restatement (Second), for the sake of clarity, the ap-
proach taken in those cases is referred to as the Restatement approach. See, e.g.,
Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962); Auten v. Auten, 308
N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
37. See, e.g., Mazza v. Mazza, 475 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Reich v. Purcell,
67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967). See generally Horowitz, The Law
of Choice of Law in California-A Restatement, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 719 (1974); Mil-
hollin, The New Choice of Law in the District of Columbia, 24 CATH. L. REV. 448
(1975); Weintraub, Comment on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 556 (1968).
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affairs of a corporation or, if they do, they are questions which
can be adjudicated pursuant to local law.38 Either of these
paths is agonizing for a court to take. It is difficult to seriously
argue that a question regarding the right of a shareholder to
inspect a corporation's books and records is not a question
relating to its "internal affairs";" once it is admitted that such
a question relates to a corporation's internal affairs, it is diffi-
cult to explain without a tremendous amount of circumlocution
why the internal affairs doctrine should not be applied.40
Other courts have employed the modern approaches of the
Restatement and governmental interest analysis, which, as a
means of circumventing the application of the internal affairs
doctrine to pseudo-foreign corporations, is less agonizing than
the characterization manipulation approach."
German-American Coffee Co. v. Diehl42 involved a stock-
holder derivative suit brought in a New York court challenging
the dividend payment of a New Jersey corporation whose prin-
cipal place of business was New York. Both New Jersey and
New York law forbade the disputed dividend, but New Jersey
law authorized only the company's stockholders to challenge
such an illegal dividend and did not allow a derivative action.
38. See Loveman v. Tutwiler Inv. Co., 240 Ala. 424, 199 So. 854 (1941); McCor-
mick v. Statler Hotels Del. Corp., 55 I1. App. 2d 21, 203 N.E.2d 697 (1964); Donna v.
Abbotts Dairies, Inc., 399 Pa. 497, 161 A.2d 13 (1960); 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2229 (rev. ed. 1976).
39. Questions regarding shareholder inspection rights commonly occur during a
nascent dispute between certain shareholders and management for control. It would
be difficult to argue that this initial step in a contest for control of the corporation does
not involve the internal affairs of the corporation; it is a dispute among individuals
within the corporate structure, and does not involve the rights of third parties.
40. A few courts have expressly questioned the wisdom of applying the internal
affairs doctrine to questions regarding the inspection rights of shareholders of pseudo-
foreign corporations. See, e.g., Toklan Royalty Corp. v. Tiffany, 93 Okla. 120, 141 P.2d
571 (1943). The essence of these decisions may be that the courts believed that share-
holder inspection rights may be regulated by more than one state without generating
a significant number of problems. Other courts have applied local law to matters
relating to the internal affairs of a foreign corporation. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Art Craft
Silk Hosiery Mills, Inc., 110 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1940) (liabilities of directors and officers
for mismanagement and waste of corporate assets); Stewart v. Bryant, 122 Cal. App.
690, 10 P.2d 799 (1932) (expenditure of corporate funds). For cases applying local law
pursuant to the state "equal treatment" statute, see, e.g., Hunter v. Merger Mines
Corp., 67 Idaho 115, 170 P.2d 800 (1946) (judicial inquiry into a corporate election);
Kahn v. American Cone & Pretzel Co., 365 Pa. 161, 74 A.2d 160 (1950) (shareholder
inspection rights).
41. It should be noted that many of the cases to be discussed involved issues
which affected local third party creditors, thus adding to the forum's interest in regu-
lating pseudo-foreign corporations.
42. 216 N.Y. 57, 109 N.E. 875 (1915).
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New York law sanctioned either remedy. Judge Cardozo stated
that "when countless corporations, organized on paper in
neighboring states, live and move and have their being in New
York, a sound public policy demands that our legislature be
invested with [a] measure of control."43 The court applied
local law and permitted the derivative action." The Supreme
Court has cited German-American Coffee with approval in de-
termining a state's power to regulate the dividends of foreign
corporations."
Weede v. Iowa Southern Utilities Co."6 involved the pro-
posed recapitalization of a Delaware corporation which did
substantially all of its business in Iowa. The Iowa Supreme
Court applied Iowa law to the proposed recapitalization, and
justified their decision in this manner:
Neither justice nor the practical necessities of the business
world can lend a sympathetic ear to the claim of a foreign
corporation, with all its business in Iowa-plants, records,
officers, etc.-that under its articles issued to it by the
authority of a foreign state, it can come into our state and
violate its statutory requirements."
43. Id. at 64, 109 N.E. at 877.
44. A rather weak argument could be made that the question regarding the
appropriateness of a derivative action involved a "question of procedure," and that no
substantive conflict of laws question was presented in the case.
45. International Harvester v. Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435, 442
(1944).
The Diehl holding was broadened in International Ticket Scale Corp. v. United
States, 165 F.2d 358 (2nd Cir. 1948), another case involving a challenge to a dividend
payment by a foreign corporation. In this case, New York law prohibited the dividend
in question, while the law of Delaware, the state of incorporation, sanctioned such a
dividend. The proposed dividend would have impaired the capital of the corporation.
The Delaware Revised Corporations Code of 1935, section 2066, permitted payment of
dividends out of net profits in the case of a capital deficit, while New York Stock
Corporation Law, section 58, prohibited dividends when capital was impaired. The
court held that New York law governed the question of the legality of the dividend.
Id. at 360. See also McQuade v. Stoneham, 230 App. Div. 57, 242 N.Y. Supp. 548 (1st
Dept. 1930), rev'd on other grounds, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234 (1934), where New
York law was applied without discussion to the question regarding the removal of an
officer of a New Jersey corporation whose principal place of business was New York.
46. 231 Iowa 734, 2 N.W.2d 372 (1942), aff'd sub nor. State v. Bechtel, 239 Iowa
1298, 31 N.W.2d 853 (1948), cert. denied sub nor. Bechtel v. Thatcher, 337 U.S. 918
(1949).
47. 239 Iowa at 1320-21, 31 N.W.2d at 865 (1948). It should be noted that this
quotation is probably dictum, since an Iowa statute expressly provided that Iowa law
governed foreign corporations engaged in utility activities, and the Delaware
corporation involved was such a corporation.
See also Goodwin v. Clayton, 137 N.C. 224, 234, 49 S.E. 173, 176 (1904), where
the North Carolina Supreme Court stated that a corporation was "born, it is true, in
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Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson" is another
case where the internal affairs doctrine was not applied to a
pseudo-foreign corporation. This was an action brought by a
shareholder in a Delaware corporation for rescission of the sale
of his stock to the corporation. The stockholder alleged, among
other things, a fraudulent conspiracy on the part of the officers,
directors and controlling shareholders. The court found that
Delaware imposed no fiduciary duty upon officers, directors or
majority shareholders regarding the purchase of stock from
other shareholders, while Louisiana law imposed such a duty.
The court applied Louisiana law, stating that "[w]hen . . .
neither the charter nor the statutory laws of the incorporating
state are applicable, and all contact points are in the forum,
we believe that the laws of the forum should govern."49
Both characterization manipulation and interest analysis
were employed to circumvent the result mandated by an appli-
cation of the internal affairs doctrine in a California case in-
volving an attempt by Western Airlines to eliminate cumula-
tive voting by charter amendment." Western Airlines was a
Delaware corporation that conducted a substantial amount of
its business in California and approximately thirty percent of
whose shares, other than those held in brokers' names, were
held by California residents.5 The proposed elimination of
cumulative voting was lawful under Delaware law, but pro-
scribed under California law. The California Corporations
Commissioner contended that this proposed amendment con-
stituted a "sale" of new stock in exchange for the old stock
under the California Corporate Securities Law (even though no
exchange of certificates was contemplated) and that, therefore,
qualification with the California Corporations Commission was
necessary.5" Western subsequently applied for a permit regard-
New Jersey, but it lives, moves, and has its being in this state." The California Su-
preme Court has stated that "the fiction as to the situs of the corporate entity being
in the state of its creation ought to yield in the interest of justice to the actual facts."
Wait v. Kern River Mining Co., 157 Cal. 16, 21, 106 P. 98, 100 (1909).
48. 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1959). See Note, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations and the
"Internal Affairs" Rule, 1960 DUKE L.J. 477.
49. 268 F.2d at 321. A case similar to Mansfield was Blazer v. Black, 196 F.2d
139 (10th Cir. 1952), a suit by a former stockholder against an officer of an Illinois
corporation which did substantially all of its business in Kansas. The court held that
Kansas law governed. Both Mansfield and Blazer involved pseudo-foreign corpora-
tions.
50. Western Airlines v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961).
51. Id. at 402, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
52. Id. at 401, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 720. The California securities law at that time
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ing the alleged sale and the Commissioner denied the applica-
tion on the ground that the proposed change was unfair.53 West-
ern appealed this determination on the ground that the Com-
missioner exceeded his jurisdiction, since any issuance of
shares which would occur in connection with the proposed
amendment would occur outside California.
The action by the Commissioner was upheld by the court
in Western Airlines, Inc. v. Sobieski. 4 The court emphasized
the fact that Western conducted a substantial amount of busi-
ness in California. The court justified its holding both in terms
of interest analysis and on the ground that a "sale of securites"
was involved. Western contended that the Commissioner was
arbitrarily creating a class of "pseudo-foreign corporations"
and that such a classification was improper. The court re-
sponded by saying:
The commissioner did not create any new class of corpora-
tion. He merely named a class of corporations which has,
in effect, existed for many years, one with its technical
domicile outside of this state but one which exercises most
of its corporate vitality within the state. Unless it can be
said that the Corporation Commissioner's characterization
of such corporation as "pseudo-foreign" is aribtrary, it
would appear to be a matter well within his administrative
discretion. The concept of a pseudo-foreign corporation as
defined by the Commissioner and the well-established
concept of "commercial domicile" of a corporation appear
to us to be founded upon reality.5
contained a definition of "sale" that was unusually broad. No express exemption was
provided for foreign corporations with a small number of California shareholders. 1949
Cal. Stats., ch. 384, § 1, at 699 (current version of CAL. CORP. § 25017 (West
Supp. 1976)). The California Corporate Securities Law of 1968 added such an exemp-
tion to the California regulatory scheme. Foreign corporations now do not need to
obtain a permit from the California Department of Corporations in connection with a
recapitalization or reorganization unless 25% of the outstanding shares of the corpora-
tion are held by shareholders with addresses in California. CAL. CORP. CoDe § 25103(b),
(c) (West Supp. 1976). See generally Sterling, California Corporate Securities Law of
1968, 23 Bus. LAW. 645, 651 (1968).
53. 191 Cal. App. 2d at 401-03, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 720-22. See generally Note, Vot-
ing and Blue Sky Laws, supra note 31, at 785.
54. 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961). See generally Note, Local Law
and Shareholders' Rights, supra note 3; Note, Voting and Blue Sky Laws, supra note
31; Note, Sale of Securities, supra note 31.
55. 191 Cal. App. 2d at 412, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 727. The Western Airlines opinion
is limited to those situations where a corporation does a substantial amount of business
within the state, and is arguably limited to those cases involving corporations which
fall within the rather broad definition of "pseudo-foreign corporation" advanced by the
California Commissioner of Corporation in the case. Id. See Kaplan, supra note 29, at
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Section 2115 carves out a narrow exception to the internal
affairs doctrine in situations where California's interests are
clearly paramount. In this sense, it accomplishes the same re-
sult as does the application of the Restatement or governmen-
tal interest analysis approach to choice of law problems regard-
ing pseudo-foreign corporations: California's law will be ap-
plied when a substantial interest of California will be ad-
vanced. Section 2115 reflects a legislative judgment that Cali-
fornia has the most significant relationship to a pseudo-foreign
corporation which satisfies the section 2115 tests, and that Cal-
ifornia has the greatest interest in regulating such a corpora-
tion, since its principal place of business in California and the
majority of its shareholders reside in California."
APPLYING THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DOCTRINE TO PSEUDO-FOREIGN
CORPORATIONS: COSTS TO THE PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS
Avoiding a State's Corporate Policies: A Comparison of the
California, New York and Delaware Codes
The internal affairs doctrine has been justified on the basis
that a state should have the exclusive power to regulate an
entity which it creates.57 Such a justification might have been
persuasive in an era when corporations were individually chart-
ered by specific acts of the state legislature, subject to whatever
conditions the legislature imposed," but that is no longer the
case today; automatic incorporation has long been granted in
all states.59
454.
Earlier California cases indicated a receptiveness to an erosion of the internal
affairs doctrine regarding California pseudo-foreign corporations. See Wait v. Kern
River Mining Co., 157 pal. 16, 106 P. 98 (1909); Southern Pac. Co. v. McColgan, 68
Cal. App. 2d 48, 156 P.2d 81 (1945); Sharp v. Big Jim Mines, 39 Cal. App. 2d 435, 103
P.2d 430 (1940); Stabler v. Eldora Oil Co., 27 Cal. App. 516, 150 P. 643 (1915). See
generally Comment, Quasi-Foreign Corporations, supra note 7, at 678-84.
56. The legislative report regarding the new code characterizes section 2115 as a
provision which applies California law to those corporations with "certain specified
minimum contacts" with California. REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMITTEE ON
THE REVISION OF THE CORPORATIONS CODE 19 (1975).
57. See generally Fead, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 24 MICH. L. REV.
633 (1926).
58. See generally A. BERLE, JR. & G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Pri-
vate Property 218-30 (1932); J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION
AND THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 at 133-39 (1970).
59. Automatic incorporation usually requires that articles of incorporation con-
taining certain mandatory provisions be filed with the appropriate state agency. See
authorities cited in note 58 supra.
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The policy justification normally advanced in support of
the internal affairs doctrine is that it promotes certainty re-
garding choice of law questions involving corporations with
multi-state contacts. 0 Although it does promote certainty, the
doctrine also imposes a social cost upon the state where busi-
ness is primarily conducted, since that state's policies are
circumvented. Therefore, the appropriate analysis should be
whether the benefit that accrues from such certainty exceeds
the costs imposed upon the state where a pseudo-foreign corpo-
ration has its principal place of business.
The principal cost incurred due to the rigid application of
the internal affairs doctrine to pseudo-foreign corporations is
that the social policies of the principal place of business of a
pseudo-foreign corporation are supplanted by those of the state
of incorporation. The magnitude of this cost, and therefore the
utility of the circumvention of the internal affairs doctrine dis-
cussed in the preceding section, depends upon the differences
among the corporation laws of the various states. Many Cali-
fornia pseudo-foreign corporations are chartered in Delaware
and New York. A comparison of California section 2115(b) with
the analogous Delaware and New York provisions reveals the
magnitude of these costs.
The most striking differences among the corporate laws of
California, New York and Delaware are found in those provi-
sions dealing with the rights of minority shareholders. The Cal-
ifornia code generally protects the interests of minority share-
holders to a greater degree than do the codes of New York or
Delaware. For example, the California code mandates cumula-
tive voting,6 while New York 2 and Delaware 3 law provide that
cumulative voting is optional. Similarly, staggered terms for
directors are not permitted under the California code, but are
sanctioned by New York and Delaware law." The California
60. Professor Latty has discussed in detail the possible policy justifications for
applying the internal affairs doctrine to pseudo-foreign corporations. See Latty I, supra
note 29, at 138-43.
61. CAL. CORP. CODE § 708 (West Supp. 1976).
62. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 618 (McKinney 1963).
63. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (1975).
64. The California code requires that all directors must be elected annually. CAL.
CORP. CODE § 301 (West Supp. 1976). Under New York law directors may be elected
in two, three or four staggered classes of three or more individuals if such a procedure
is included in the certificate of incorporation or by-laws. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 704
(McKinney 1963). Under Delaware law, directors may be elected in one, two or three
staggered classes of two or more individuals, if such a procedure is included in the
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code also provides safeguards for minority shareholders regard-
ing corporate reorganizations not included in either the New
York or Delaware codes."
In addition to the differences among the minority share-
holder protection provisions of California, New York and Dela-
ware, there are significant differences regarding the rules gov-
erning indemnification" of and liability insurance 7 for officers
certificate of incorporation or by-laws of the corporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
141(d) (Supp. 1975).
65. The California code provides that in connection with any merger, other than
a short-form merger, the common shares of a disappearing corporation may be con-
verted only into common shares of the surviving corporation, unless all of the share-
holders of the disappearing corporation approve another plan. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv.,
ch. 641, § 19, at 1653-54 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 1101). In connection with a sale
of assets transaction, if the buyer controls the seller the principal terms of such a sale
must be approved by at least 90% of the seller's outstanding shares, unless the share-
holders of the seller receive common shares of the buyer in consideration of the sale.
Id. § 18.8, at 1653 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 1001(d)). In connection with a con-
trolled party reorganization or short-form merger, the new code provides that if a
shareholder foregoes shareholder appraisal rights, he may institute an action attack-
ing the validity of the proposed reorganization or short-form merger. Id. § 22.5, at
1660-61 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 1312(b)). In such an action, the controlling party
has the burden of establishing that the transaction is "just and reasonable as to the
shareholders of the controlled party." Id. at 1661 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE §
1312(c)).
66. In any "proceeding" other than a derivative action, the California code sanc-
tions indemnification of any officer, director or agent "against expenses, judgments,
fines [and] settlements," if that person acted "in good faith, and in a manner such
person reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the corporation." Id. § 11, at
1639 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(b)). The standard in New York is essentially
the same. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 723 (McKinney 1963). Delaware sanctions indemnifi-
cation in both derivative and non-derivative actions if the individual acted in "good
faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best
interests of the corporation." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a), (b) (1975) (emphasis
added).
Regarding derivative actions, the California code provides that indemnification
may be given for "expenses" but no indemnification may be made, with or without
court approval, against amounts paid in settling a derivative action. 1976 Cal. Legis.
Serv., ch. 641, § 11, at 1639 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(c)). In New York a
corporation is not permitted to indemnify an officer or director for amounts paid to
settle a derivative action, or for amounts expended in defending a threatened action
which is later settled or otherwise disposed of without court approval. New York,
otherwise, does allow indemnification for expenses, including attorney fees. N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 722 (McKinney 1963).
Delaware, however, allows a corporation to indemnify an officer or director for
expenses incurred in connection with a settlement made with or without court ap-
proval, as well as for expenses incurred in the defense of a derivative action. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (1975). Unlike New York, California and Delaware allow indemni-
fication for expenses upon court approval for any matter where the individual has been
adjudged liable to the corporation. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 722 (McKinney 1963); 1976
Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 641, § 11, at 1639 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(c)); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (1975).
In Delaware, the indemnification limits may be extended in the by-laws, by a vote
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and directors by the corporation, as well as the standard of care
for a director." California's provisions impose more restrictions
of the shareholders or disinterested directors or "otherwise." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
145(f) (1975). California proscribes the extension of the indemnification limits through
the articles of incorporation or by-laws. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 641, § 11, at 1640
(amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(g)).
67. In California a corporation is granted the power to purchase and maintain
insurance on behalf of any agent of the corporation, and such insurance may cover
liabilities not otherwise sanctioned under section 317. Id. (amending CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 317(i)). Delaware law expressly sanctions the purchase by a corporation of indemnifi-
cation insurance covering any liability "whether or not the corporation would have the
power to indemnify such liability under the provisions of [section 145]." DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (1975). See generally Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New
Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078,
1086 (1968).
New York law provides that a corporation may maintain indemnity insurance, but
the insurance maintained may not cover those instances where it is established that
the officer or director committed "acts of active and deliberate dishonesty material to
the cause of action so adjudicated, or that he personally gained in fact a financial profit
or other advantage to which he was not legally entitled." N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 727
(McKinney Supp. 1976).
68. The standard of care for a director is expressly outlined in the California
code. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 641, § 9.5, at 1636 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE §
309(a)). The section sets forth a standard of care for directors but does not mention
non-director officers. Therefore, an officer may not be able to rely on the factual
information to the same degree as a non-officer director. See Committee on Corporate
Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 29 Bus. LAW. 947, 951, 953
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Committee on Corporate Laws]. See generally Mattes,
The Burden of the Corporate Director Elected Noncumulatively, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 463
(1975).
An extensive discussion of section 309 is beyond the scope of this article, but the
most important provisions will be mentioned. The section expressly provides that a
director's duty includes "reasonable inquiry" when the circumstances indicate that
such inquiry is necessary. See REPORT OF THE ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMITrEE ON THE
REVISION OF THE CORPORATIONS CODE 48-54 (1975). See generally National Auto. & Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Payne, 261 Cal. App. 2d 403, 413, 67 Cal. Rptr. 784, 790 (1968). According
to section 309(a), a director must act "as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would [act] under similar circumstances." 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 641, § 309, at
1636 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 309 (a)). It should be noted that the standard is
"an ordinarily prudent person," as opposed to "an ordinarily prudent business person"
or the like. It has been suggested, however, that the inclusion of the term "under
similar circumstances" was intended, among other things, to increase the standard for
a director with business experience. See Committee on Corporate Laws, supra, at 954.
The New York standard of care requires a director to act in good faith with that
degree of care which an "ordinarily prudent man would exercise under similar circum-
stances." N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney 1963).
Delaware's code does not provide an express standard of care for directors, and
Delaware courts seem to have evolved a relatively lax "business judgment" standard.
See, e.g., Graham v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 85, 188 A.2d 125, 130
(Sup. Ct. 1963).
With regard to the provisions in the respective states governing the information
upon which a director may rely, compare 1967 Cal. Stats., ch. 843, § 1, at 2268 (amend-
ing CAL. CORP. CODE § 829, repealed 1975) with 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 641, § 9.5,
at 1636 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(b)); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717 (McKinney
1963); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(e), 172 (1975).
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upon the discretion of management regarding indemnification
and impose a somewhat higher standard of care, especially in
contrast to the Delaware provisions.
There are also a substantial number of significant differ-
ences among the corporate laws of California, New York, and
Delaware regarding other aspects of the manner in which cor-
porate internal affairs are conducted, especially with respect to
reorganizations, 9 shareholder appraisal rights,70 distributions,7
69. All types of "reorganizations," including exchange reorganizations, sales of
assets and mergers (see 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 641, § 4.6, at 1628-29 (amending
CAL. CORP. CODE § 181)), generally are treated uniformly under the California code.
See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1200 (West Supp. 1976). The board of directors of each constitu-
ent corporation generally must approve a merger or a "sale of assets," reorganization,
while only the board of the acquiring corporation must approve an exchange reorgani-
zation. Id. Approval by a majority of the outstanding shares is normally required if
board approval of the corporation is required. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 641, § 21, at
1657 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201(a)).
Delaware law provides that the board of each constituent corporation and a major-
ity of the outstanding shares of each such corporation must approve a plan of merger.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1975). A corporation's board and a majority of its
outstanding shares must approve a plan to sell substantially all of its assets. Id. § 271.
New York law provides that the board of each constituent corporation and two thirds
of the outstanding shares of each corporation must approve a plan of merger. N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW §§ 902, 903 (McKinney Supp. 1976). A corporation's board and two thirds
of its outstanding shares also must approve a plan to sell substantially all of its assets.
Id. § 909.
70. The California code generally provides appraisal rights for those shareholders
who do not consent to a proposed reorganization in those situations where shareholder
approval is required, unless the corporation's shares are listed on a national securities
exchange. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 641, § 21.3, at 1658-59 (amending CAL. CORP.
CODE § 1300(b)). Delaware law provides for shareholder appraisal rights in connection
with a merger in which shareholder approval is required, unless the corporation has
securities listed on a national securities exchange or has more than 1999 shareholders.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1975). Appraisal rights are not available in connection
with an exchange reorganization or a sale of assets transaction. Id. § 271. Hariton v.
Arco Elec., Inc., 40 Del. Ch. 326, 182 A.2d 22 (1962), aff'd 41 Del. Ch. 74, 188 A.2d
123 (1963).
Under New York law, shareholder appraisal rights are generally only available in
those situations where shareholder approval is required in connection with a merger
or sale of assets transaction. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 910(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
Cf. id. § 806(b)(6) (a holder of any adversely affected shares who does not vote for or
consent in writing to an amendment or change in the corporation's certificate shall
have the right to dissent and receive payment for such shares in certain circumstan-
ces).
71. A novel test regarding proscribed dividend distributions is employed in the
California code. It provides that a corporation may make a distribution only if the
amount of its retained earnings immediately prior thereto equals or exceeds the
amount of the proposed distribution, 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 641, § 14, at 1644
(amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 500(a)), or if the assets of the corporation (exclusive of
goodwill) are at least equal to one and one-quarter times its liabilities and the current
assets of the corporation at least equal its current liabilities. Id. at 1644-45 (amending
CAL. CORP. CODE § 500(b)). New York and Delaware law reflect the traditional require-
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reports to shareholders," and the manner by which director
vacancies are filled.73
The application of the internal affairs doctrine to a
pseudo-foreign corporation results in its internal affairs being
governed by the law of its state of incorporation, rather than
the law of its principal place of business. Since there are a
substantial number of signficant differences among the corpo-
rate laws of California, New York, and Delaware regarding the
manner in which corporate internal affairs are conducted, the
application of the internal affairs doctrine to such a corporation
results in a significant social cost. That cost is the pseudo-
ment that distributions may be made only out of "surplus." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
170(a) (1975); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 510(b) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
California and New York law proscribe the payment of a dividend which would
render the corporation insolvent. CAL. CORP. CODE § 501 (West Supp. 1976); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 510(a) (McKinney 1963). Delaware law contains no such express prohibi-
tion. Such a provision may not be necessary, however, since Delaware has enacted the
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1301-12 (1975).
72. The California code generally requires a corporation to send an annual report
containing certain specified financial information to its shareholders within four
months of the close of its fiscal year. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 641, § 23, at 1661
(amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 1501(a)). This requirement may be waived in the by-
laws by corporations with fewer than 100 shareholders. Id. More detailed reporting is
required of those corporations with no class of securities registered under section 12 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which have more than 99 shareholders of record.
Id. (amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 1501(b)). In addition, holders of at least an aggregate
of five percent of the outstanding shares may obtain interim financial information. Id.
at 1662 (amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 1501(c)).
In contrast, New York law provides that a corporation is required to furnish
minimal financial information on an annual basis, and only when the holders of an
aggregate of five percent of the outstanding shares or a shareholder of record for at least
six months so request. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 624(e) (McKinney Supp. 1976). Dela-
ware law has no reporting requirement.
73. Under the California code the holders of an aggregate of five percent of the
outstanding shares may petition to call a special meeting of the shareholders to elect
an entire board when less than a majority of the directors in office have been elected
by the shareholders. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 641, § 7.5, at 1634 (amending CAL.
CORP. CODE § 305(c)). In New York, director vacancies may be filled by a majority vote
of the remaining directors, even if less than a quorum, unless the certificate of incorpo-
ration reserves this power to the shareholders. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 705 (McKinney
Supp. 1976). The Delaware code provides that director vacancies generally may be
filled by a majority of the remaining directors, although less than a quorum. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 223(a) (Supp. 1975). If the directors in office constitute "less than a
majority of the whole Board" the holders of at least ten percent of the outstanding
shares may petition a court to call a shareholder election to fill any director vacancies.
Id. § 223(c).
For a further comparison of the differences between the corporate laws of Califor-
nia and Delaware, see Halloran & Hammer, Section 2115 of the New California Gen-
eral Corporation Law-The Application of California Corporation Law to Foreign
Corporations, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1282, 1295 (1976).
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foreign corporation's ability to ignore the public policies of the
state of its principal place of business.74
The Financial Costs of the Internal Affairs Doctrine and
Gresham's Law
In addition to the social costs which flow from the applica-
tion of the internal affairs doctrine to pseudo-foreign corpora-
tions, the internal affairs doctrine has been criticized for its
Gresham's Law effect upon state corporations codes. Gres-
ham's Law is the name given to the following economic princi-
ple: when two coins are equal in debt-paying'value but unequal
in intrinsic value, the one having the lesser intrinsic value
tends to remain in circulation while the' other tends to be
hoarded or exported as bullion. It has been generalized to stand
for any situation where the cheap drives out the valuable. 5
In the present context Gresham's Law effect refers to the
situation where the presence of states with enabling type corpo-
ration laws tends to force states with more restrictive corpora-
tions codes to abandon their statutory schemes and follow
suit. Since corporations have been able to circumvent a state's
corporations code merely by incorporating in another state,
there has been no incentive for a state to enact a relatively
strict code.7" Similarly, attempts by states to regulate corporate
74. The corporation codes of Delaware, New York and California are now fairly
representative of the manner in which states currently regulate corporate activity. If
statutory schemes analogous to section 2115 become more common and the Gresham's
Law effect (see text accompanying note 75 infra) of the internal affairs doctrine on
state corporation law is thereby minimized, even greater differences among state cor-
poration codes could result.
75. See Kaplan, supra note 29, at 437.
76. See, e.g., Thiokol Holders Move to Thwart Unwanted Takeover Attempts,
Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1973, at 10, col. 4; May, More Firms Adopt Delaware as Legal
Home to Benefit from Liberal Corporation Law, Wall St. J., Apr. 16, 1968, at 6, col.
2. See generally Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Downs, Michigan to Have a New Corporation Code?, 18
WAYNE L. REV. 913 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Downs]; Folk, Does State Corporation
Law Have a Future?, 8 GA. ST. B.J. 311 (1972); Henning, Federalism and Corporate
Law: The Chaos Inherent in the Cary Proposal, 3 SEc. REG. L.J. 362 (1976); Jennings,
The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 193 (1958); Kaplan, supra note 29; Latty I, supra note 29; Latty, Why
Are Business Corporation Laws Largely "Enabling"?, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 599 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Latty Il; Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware
Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861 (1969).
This attitude is reflected by the approach recently taken by the Chicago Bar
Association Committee on Corporation Law regarding the proposed amendment to the
Illinois Business Corporation Act which would have made cumulative voting optional
in Illinois. The Committee decided that mandatory cumulative voting should be elimi-
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activities more stringently have been undermined by those
states which have enacted "enabling" type codes." Under the
specter of their domestic businesses incorporating or reincor-
porating elsewhere, with the concomitant loss of charter fees,78
franchise taxes, and control over corporations which transact
business in the state, restrictive states have amended their
laws to make them more enabling.
nated in Illinois, since the requirement was being circumvented in any event by Dela-
ware incorporation. See Kaplan, Fiduciary Responsibility in the Management of the
Corporation, 31 Bus. LAW. 883, 885-86 (1976).
77. One commentator has suggested that one of four approaches underlies the
various state schemes of regulating corporations:
At one extreme, under the so-called "enabling act" theory, the privilege
of incorporation would be made freely available, with a minimum of
special conditions and limitations. Somewhat more restrictive is another
theory whose adherents, although essentially persuaded of the social effi-
cacy of enlightened self-interest, favor the interposition of legislative safe-
guards at critical junctures where experience has indicated that difficul-
ties may arise. Another theory would by legislative prescription even
more systematically impinge upon freedom to contract, not only to pro-
tect investors and creditors, but to create and preserve the atmosphere
of public confidence so necessary for business prosperity. And, finally, at
the other extreme, the proponents of the so-called "social responsibility"
theory urged that corporate power be exercised not primarily for the
benefit of investors and creditors, or even customers and employees, but
rather for the benefit of the general public.
Shimm, Foreword, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 175 (1958).
78. "It has been said that [c]harter mongering has a long and somewhat unsa-
vory heritage in state corporation law." Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate
Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 LAW & Contemp. Prob. 193, 194 (1958). See
Latty I, supra note 29; Latty II, supra note 76.
The state scramble for corporate charter fees was evident in the Delaware statute
preamble:
Whereas, the State of Delaware has a long and beneficial history of
the domicile of nationally known corporations; and
Whereas, the favorable climate which the State of Delaware has
traditionally provided for corporations has been a leading source of reve-
nue for the State; and
Whereas, many states have enacted new corporation laws in recent
years in an effort to compete with Delaware corporate business; and
Whereas, there has been no comprehensive revision of the Delaware
corporation law since its enactment in 1898; and
Whereas, the general assembly of the State of Delaware declares it
to be the public policy of the State to maintain a favorable business
climate and to encourage corporations to make Delaware their domi-
cile. .. .
Law of Dec. 31, 1963, ch. 218, 1963 Del. Laws 724. Similarly, a member of the Delaware
Law Revision Commission of 1967 noted, when discussing the reasons for the law
revision, that "the franchise tax dollar is very important." Carroon, The Proposed New
Delaware Corporation Statute, 20 J. LEGAL ED. 522 (1968). Franchise taxes represented
$52 million out of a total of $222 million collected in taxes by Delaware in 1971. U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATE TAX COLLECTION IN 1972 at 16 (Dec. 1972).
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Many commentators have noted that the trend in recent
decades has been to promulgate permissive corporations
codes."9 Although the wisdom of such a trend is beyond the
scope of this article, 0 there are many indications that the deci-
sions of the respective states regarding this trend were signifi-
cantly affected by their awareness of the internal affairs doc-
trine. For example, the report of the Corporation Law Revision
Commission of New Jersey states:
It is clear that the major protections to investors, creditors,
employees, customers, and the general public have come,
and must continue to come, from federal legislation and
not from state corporation acts . . . any attempt to pro-
vide such regulations in the public interest through state
incorporation acts and similar legislation would only drive
79. See generally Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Cary, Summary of Article on Federalism and
Corporate Law, 31 Bus. LAW. 1105 (1976); Folk, Does State Corporation Law Have a
Future?, 8 GA. ST. B.J. 311 (1972); Henning, Federal Corporate Chartering for Big
Business: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 915 (1972); Jennings,
The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROS. 193 (1958); Latty I, supra note 29; Latty II, supra note 76; Schwartz,
A Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 Bus. LAW. 1125 (1976); Comment,
Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 61
(1969).
The chairman of the committee which prepared the 1962 amendments to the
Model Business Corporation Act stated that "corporate law has tended more and more
in the direction of a simple set of workable ground rules for the corporate enterprise,
leaving regulation either to the equitable jurisdiction of the courts or to regulation
through statutes of a policing nature or through the informed judgment of adminis-
trative agencies." Gibson, Surplus, So What? The Model Act Modernized, 17 Bus.
LAW. 476, 482-83 (1962).
Professor J.W. Hurst has offered an historical explanation for these developments
in J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 1780-1970 at 13-57 (1970). Hurst argues that the trend toward enabling corpora-
tion statutes began early in the twentieth century as a result of the country's confid-
ence in the constructive uses of the corporate form. In addition, the country's economic
boom was just beginning and legislatures were reluctant to restrict corporations. After
1929, however, the need for regulation became apparent, and in an effort "to define
and enforce the responsibility of corporate power the law turned more and more to
specialized regulation outside the structure of the corporation." Id. at xii.
80. The vast majority of commentators have criticized this trend. See generally,
H. RUESCHLEIN, THE SCHOOLS OF CORPORATE REFORM (1950); R. Nader, The Case for
Federal Incorporation, at 5, Oct. 30-31, 1971 (presentation to Conferences on Corporate
Accountability); Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Harris, The Model Business Corporation Act-Invitation to
Irresponsibility?, 50 Nw. U.L. REV. 1 (1955); Latty, Some General Observations on the
New Business Corporation Law of New York, 11 BUFFALO L. REV. 591 (1962); Schwartz,
Federal Chartering of Corporations: An Introduction, 61 GEo. L.J. 71 (1972). But see
Arsht, Reply to Professor Cary, 31 Bus. LAW. 1113 (1976); Drexler, Federalism and
Corporate Law, a Misguided Missile, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 374 (1976).
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corporations out of the state to more hospitable jurisdic-
tions."
Statements made by the drafters or sponsors of other state
corporations codes indicate that the codes were drafted with a
view to encouraging local incorporation. Professor Henn, a
member of the Joint Legislative Committee regarding the revi-
sion of the New York corporations code, stated that "[o]ne
ever-present strand in the thinking of the Joint Legislative
Committee was to foster New York incorporation of business
and retention of existing business corporations . ... s
81. Report of the Corporation Law Revision Commission in N.J. STAT. ANN. §
14A, at XI (West 1969).
Historian Charles A. Beard made a similar statement in his testimony before the
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary:
Under the leadership of Woodrow Wilson, after he was challenged by
Theodore Roosevelt to reform his own state, the Legislature of New Jersey
passed a series of laws doing away with corporate abuses and applying
high standards to corporations. What was the result? The revenues of the
State from taxes on corporations fell. Malefactors moved over into other
states. In time the New Jersey Legislature repealed its strict and prudent
legislation, and went back, not quite, but almost to old ways . . . . It
is folly to expect all the States and Territories to apply strict and uniform
principles to corporate legislation; the business of controlling corpora-
tions engaged in interstate commerce belongs to the Government of the
United States. That seems to me to be the lesson we learn from history.
Hearings on S. 10 Before the Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 326 (1937).
Justice Brandeis made this comment regarding Gresham's Law and the internal
affairs doctrine: "Companies were early formed to provide charters for corporations in
states where the cost was lowest and the laws least restrictive. The states joined in
advertising their wares. The race was one not of diligence but of laxity." Liggett Co.
v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 556-59 (dissenting opinion).
82. Henn, The Philosophies of the New York Business Corporation Law of 1961,
11 BUFFALO L. REV. 439, 453 (1962). Tom Downs, the sponsor of the recently enacted
revision of the Michigan corporations code, made this statement which reflects a
similar intention on the part of the drafters of that revision: "The work of the
[revision] was conducted on a bi-partisan basis with the primary purpose of a unified,
simple code that would, in the words of some, 'out-Delaware Delaware.' " Downs,
supra note 76, at 914.
The preface to New Jersey's recently amended corporation laws proudly proclaims
in its heading-"New Law Enabling, Not Restrictive." It is also stated there that the
New Jersey laws as embodied in the amendments are "flexible and permissive" corpo-
ration laws "perhaps further than any other state." [sic]. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A at
XI (West 1969).
A recent advertisement by the State of Nevada in the Wall Street Journal reflects
a similar attempt to market the state's corporations code. This advertisement attrib-
uted the following statement to Nevada's Secretary of State: "Forming a corporation:
Are you considering forming a corporation? If you are, I believe that Nevada and
Delaware have the most liberal and workable corporation laws in the United States.
I further believe that Nevada has the following distinct advantages over Delaware
... " Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1975, at 18 (eastern ed.).
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The chronology of the amendments to the corporations
codes of various states manifests the Gresham's Law effect. For
example, the 1967 amendments to the Delaware corporations
code included a provision regarding indemnification which,
among other things, expressly sanctioned the payment by a
corporation of premiums for indemnification insurance for its
officers and directors."3 Delaware was the first state to adopt
such a provision. California, 4 Georgia,85 Ohio,"6 Virginia,"
Pennsylvania," and New Jersey 9 amended their respective cor-
porations codes in essentially the same manner within one
year. 0 It appears that these states were placed under a sub-
stantial amount of pressure to follow Delaware's example re-
garding this controversial and important issue.
It has been suggested by other commentators that effective
regulation of corporate activity and protection of the rights of
minority shareholders can only be achieved either through
minimum standards of corporate regulation promulgated by
Congress' or by mandatory federal incorporation. 2 The federal
One aspect of Professor Folk's initial assignment as Reporter for the Delaware
Corporation Law Revision Commission was "to ascertain what other states have to
attract corporations that [Delaware does] not have." Comment, Law for Sale: A
Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 861, 866 (1969).
This reflects a similar intent to market the state's corporations code.
83. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (Supp. 1970).
84. CAL. CORP. CODE § 830(h) (West 1968) (current version at 1976 Cal. Legis.
Serv. ch. 641, § 11, at 1640, amending CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(i)).
85. GA. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 22-202(16)(1968).
86. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E), (Page Supp. 1975).
87. VA. CODE ANN. tit. 13.1, 13.1-3.1 (Supp. 1976).
88. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 410 (Purdon Supp. 1976).
89. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 14A: 3-5 (Supp. 1976).
90. In addition, North Carolina amended its indemnification provisions in sub-
stantially the same manner in 1969. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-19, 55-20 (1975). The
analogous provisions of the laws of South Carolina and Arkansas were similarly
amended in 1973. S.C. CODE § 12-18.18 (Cum. Supp. 1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-309
(Cum. Supp. 1973).
91. See, e.g., Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Cary, A Proposed Federal Corporate Minimum Standards Act,
29 Bus. LAW. 1101 (1974); Cary, Summary of Article on Federalism and Corporate Law,
31 Bus. LAW. 1105 (1976).
A number of commentators have criticized the approach advocated by Professor
Cary. See, e.g., Henning, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Chaos Inherent in the
Cary Proposal, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 362 (1976); Schwartz, A CASE FOR FEDERAL CHARTERING
OF CORPORATIONS, 31 Bus. LAW. 1125 (1976).
92. See R. NADER, J. SELIGMAN & M. GREEN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION
(1976); Brabner-Smith, Federal Incorporation of Business, 24 VA. L. REv. 159 (1937);
Grosscup, The Corporation Problem and the Lawyer's Part in Its Solution, 39 AM. L.
REV. 835, 849-51 (1905); Henning, Federal Corporate Chartering for Big Business: An
Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 915 (1972); Henning, Federalism
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courts are already evolving a federal common law of corpora-
tions pursuant to the federal securities laws,93 partially in re-
sponse to the "enabling" type state corporations codes. It
seems inevitable that federal regulation of the internal affairs
of corporations will continue to increase if the internal affairs
doctrine is applied to all corporations and its Gresham's Law
and Corporate Law: The Chaos Inherent in the Cary Proposal, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 362
(1976); Nader, The Case for Federal Chartering, in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 67
(R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1973); Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of
Corporations, 31 Bus. LAW. 1125 (1976); Schwartz, Federal Chartering of Corporations:
An Introduction, 61 GEO. L.J. 71 (1972); Snapp, National Incorporation, 5 ILL. L. REV.
414 (1911); Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations: A Proposal, 61 GEO. L.J. 89
(1972). But see Aranson, Federal Chartering of Corporations: An Idea Well Worth
Forgetting, 8 Bus. & Soc. REV. 59 (1974). For a history of the proposals for national
chartering, see Reuschlein, Federalization-Design for Corporate Reform in a National
Economy, 91 U. PA. L. REV. 91 (1942). It should also be noted that the National
Democratic Party platform for 1972 called for federal action to "establish a temporary
national economic commission to study federal chartering of large multi-national and
international corporations .... " 30 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 1728 (1972).
A number of other nations which are similarly comprised of numerous states and
territories regulate corporate activity pursuant to national rather than regional legisla-
tion. For example, India, which contains 24 states and territories, regulates
corporations pursuant to national legislation. Mexico, which contains 29 states with
their own respective civil codes, regulates corporate activity pursuant to federal legisla-
tion. South Africa, comprised of four provinces, has only one companies act. For an
extensive discussion of the corporation laws of various nations, see Conard, An Over-
view of the Laws of Corporations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 623 (1973).
93. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (regarding the validity
of proxy and the invalidity of a merger); Green v. Sante Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283
(2d Cir. 1976) (a short-form merger held unfair); Marshel v. A.F.W. Fabric Corp., 533
F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1976) (merger enjoined because it was deemed unfair); McClure v.
Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961) (regarding security for costs); Miller v.
Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (regarding appraisal rights). The Second
Ciruit held in Green and Marshel that a fully disclosed but unfair transaction in
connection with the sale of securities is proscribed by section 10 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. This represents a significant extension of the requirements of
the federal securities laws since federal courts have generally not found a violation of
the 1934 Act solely due to the unfairness of a transaction. Some element of deception
has traditionally been required. See generally Patrick, Rule lOb-5, Equitable Fraud
and Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 21 ALA. L. REV. 457 (1969); Note, The Controlling
Influence Standard in Rule lOb-5 Corporate Mismanagement Cases, 86 HARv. L. REV.
1007 (1973).
Almost all of the decisions cited above are based primarily upon either sections
10 or 14 of the Federal Securities Act of 1934. It should be noted that there are
limitations upon the scope of these sections. Section 14, regarding disclosures in proxy
statements, only applies to those corporations with 500 or more shareholders of record
and $1,000,000 in assets. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1) (1970). Section 10(b) applies to all
corporations, but the plaintiff in such an action must have "purchased" or "sold" a
security. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See
generally Jacobs, Standing to Sue Under lob-5 After Blue Chip Stamps, 3 SEC. REG.
L.J. 387 (1976); Jennings, Federalization of Corporation Law: Part Way or All the
Way, 31 Bus. LAW. 991 (1976).
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effect upon state corporations codes is allowed to continue 4
The application of the internal affairs doctrine to pseudo-
foreign corporations has discouraged states from enacting strict
corporation laws, and has encouraged states to adopt
permissive corporations codes in order to entice new business
to incorporate in the state and generate charter fees and fran-
chise tax revenues. Provisions such as section 2115 should mute
these Gresham's Law effects since most pseudo-foreign corpo-
rations will no longer be able to circumvent the corporations
code of its principal place of business. National corporations
and corporations with securities registered on a national securi-
ties exchange, 5 of course, will continue to be able to shop for
the most convenient corporations code.
The narrow exception to the internal affairs doctrine em-
bodied in section 2115 represents a constructive attempt to
retain the internal affairs doctrine regarding corporations with
multi-state contacts, while attempting to insure that the state
with the clearly dominant interest in regulating the internal
affairs of the corporation will be able to do so. The desired
certainty of application of the law governing corporations with
multi-state contacts is maximized; section 2115 clearly sets
forth which foreign corporations are within its scope and the
term during which it governs the internal affairs of such corpo-
rations.
SECTION 2115 AND THE CONSTITUTION
There are constitutional limitations upon choice of law
decisions. Choice of law determinations have been found to
constitute a violation of either the due process clause96 or the
full faith and credit clause 7 of the Constitution. In addition,
there is some question whether section 2115 violates the com-
merce clause. 8 The applicability of these constitutional limita-
tions to section 2115 is explored below.
94. The enactment of state legislative schemes such as section 2115 represents
the only way federal incorporation, or at least the promulgation of minimal standards
of corporate regulation by Congress, can be avoided.
95. Such corporations are, of course, regulated by their respective exchanges.
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall . . . deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. .. ."
97. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8:
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The Due Process Clause
This section discusses whether applying California law to
pseudo-foreign corporations which satisfy the section 2115
tests, generally constitutes a violation of the due process
clause. Also considered is the potential due process problem
that arises where a pseudo-foreign corporation, whose officers'
certificate indicates that it satisfies the section 2115 tests,
drastically reduces its California contacts prior to the end of
the relevant fiscal year.
The Supreme Court has held that it is a violation of the
due process clause for a state to apply its law to a matter with
which the state has no significant contacts." Despite early indi-
cations that the Court was going to interpret the due process
clause as requiring application of the vested rights choice of law
approach,0 0 it now seems clear that it is constitutionally per-
missible for a state to apply its law when it has a reasonable
connection with the matters in controversy. 0'
The Supreme Court's decreased inclination to prescribe
rigid choice of law rules pursuant to the due process clause is
illustrated by its decision in Watson v. Employers Liability
Assurance Corp. 02 There, the plaintiff, a resident of the forum,
brought an action against the insurer of the manufacturer of a
product which had injured her. A clause in the policy barred a
direct action by an injured party against the insurance com-
pany. Such a clause was valid under the law of Massachusetts,
the state where the contract was executed, and the law of Illi-
nois, the principal place of business of the insured, but invalid
under the law of the forum. The forum applied its law to the
"The Congress shall have the Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes ....
99. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); see generally Slater v. Mexican
Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
100. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292
U.S. 143 (1934); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
101. See generally Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Watson v.
Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 70-73 (1954); Hoopeston Canning v.
Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 500 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 540-42 (1935); Baraf, supra note 20, at 237-240; Hilpert &
Cooley, The Federal Constitution and the Choice of Law, 25 WASH. U. L.Q. 27 (1939);
Kaplan, supra note 29, at 445-50; Latty I, supra note 29, at 162-66; Leflar,
Constitutional Limits on Free Choice of Law, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 706 (1963).
It may not constitute a sufficient connection if one of the parties to the action is a non-
resident domiciliary. See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
102. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
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contract, and the insurer argued that this violated due process.
The Supreme Court held that the forum's application of its law
was constitutional since "more states than one may seize hold
of local activities which are part of multi-state transactions and
may regulate to protect interests of its own people.' ' 3 The
Court emphasized the forum's interest in protecting injured
residents.
A similar approach was taken by the Supreme Court in
Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.'04 This case involved a suit
by a forum resident against a foreign insurance company under
a policy which the plaintiff had purchased when he resided
outside the forum. A term in the policy limited the period
during which actions on claims could be brought. This limita-
tion was valid in the state where the contract was executed but
invalid in the forum. The forum applied its law and the Su-
preme Court held that that was constitutional, since the forum
had "ample contacts with the transaction.' 0 5
The modern approach taken by the Supreme Court toward
constitutional limitations upon choice of law questions is re-
flected in the following excerpt from Richards v. United States:
Where more than one state has a sufficiently substan-
tial contact with the activity in question, the forum state,
by analysis of the interests possessed by the states in-
volved, could constitutionally apply to the decision of the
case the law of one or another state having such an interest
in the multi-state activity. °6
In view of these general principles, applying California law
to pseudo-foreign corporations that satisfy the section 2115
tests presents no problem under the due process clause. Such
corporations normally have substantial contacts with Califor-
nia during the term they are governed by California law.
103. Id. at 72.
104. 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
105. Id. at 183. In an earlier dissenting opinion in the same case, Justice Douglas
justified the Supreme Court's increased flexibility toward choice of law determinations
in this manner:
As business bloomed throughout our growing country giving more
states than one an interest in what a contract meant and how it should
be enforced for the benefit of the citizens who made it or for whose benefit
it was made, practical men began to see that there could not be one single
rule of law to govern a contract in which the citizens of many states were
interested.
363 U.S. 207, 218 (1960).
106. 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962).
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A different constitutional problem arises when a pseudo-
foreign corporation so reduces its contacts with California dur-
ing an income year for which it initially satisfied the require-
ments of section 2115(a) that the application of California law
until the end of that year could violate the rule of Home Insur-
ance Co. v. Dick,'07 which prohibits the forum state from apply-
ing its law without significant contacts with the controversy.
Section 2115(d) provides inter alia that section 2115(a)
shall cease to be applicable at the end of a pseudo-foreign
corporation's income year during which a court of competent
jurisdiction enters an order declaring that one of the section
2115(a) requirements is not met. 05 Thus, despite the fact that
a court may find that a pseudo-foreign corporation no longer
meets the section 2115 tests, the internal affairs of that corpo-
ration will remain subject to California law for the remainder
of its income year following the court's order. Statutes will be
given a meaning consistent with constitutional requirements if
this can be done by fair and reasonable interpretation,09 but it
is far from certain that this provision can be interpreted to
meet the Home Insurance requirements. Therefore, it may be
advisable to append the following saving clause to section
2115(d):
The provisions of the preceding sentence notwith-
standing, Subdivision (a) shall cease to be applicable to
any foreign corporation when its contacts with California
are so reduced that the application of California law would
be unconstitutional.
The addition of such a provision would insure that California
law would be applied only when a foreign corporation had suffi-
cient contacts with California to satisfy the minimum constitu-
tional requirements for the application of California law.
107. 281 U.S. 397 (1930). See text accompanying note 99 supra.
108. 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 641, § 32.5, at 1674-75 (amending CAL. CORP.
CODE § 2115(d)).
Section 2115(d) provides that a pseudo-foreign corporation may escape the provi-
sions of California law imposed by section 2115(b) where the officers' certificate shows
or a court declares that the corporation no longer meets the section 2115(a) require-
ments. Therefore, it may be inferred that section 2115(d) can be asserted by a pseudo-
foreign corporation as a defense to an action based on its failure to observe California
law pursuant to section 2115(b).
109. Braxton v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d 138, 145, 514 P.2d 697, 701, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 897, 901 (1973).
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Full Faith and Credit Clause
The Constitution provides that a state shall give full faith
and credit to the "public Acts, Records and judicial Proceed-
ings of every other State.""' This clause generally has been
invoked to avoid actual conflicts between the regulatory
schemes of different states."' The issue presented is whether,
in a California action, the corporate codes of the states of incor-
poration of pseudo-foreign corporations must be granted full
faith and credit.
Although the phrase "public Acts, Records and judicial
Proceedings" has been construed to include statutes"' as well
as judicial decisions, 3 the Supreme Court has rarely held that
full faith and credit requires the application of the law of one
state in the courts of another, and the Court has become in-
creasingly reluctant to so hold. In the choice of law field, the
Supreme Court has enforced the full faith and credit clause in
only three areas: ' 4 workmen's compensation laws,"5 share-
holder assessments,"6 and fraternal benefit insurance associa-
tions."7 These cases can be construed narrowly.
In the area of workmen's compensation, the Supreme
Court has held that full faith and credit requires the applica-
110. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
111. See generally Costigan, The History of the Adoption of Section I of Article
IV of the United States Constitution and a Consideration of the Effect on Judgments
of that Section and of Federal Legislation, 4 COLUM. L. REV. 470 (1904); Holt, Full
Faith and Credit-A Suggested Approach to the Problem of Recognition of Foreign
Corporations, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 453 (1941); Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The
Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1945); Nadelmann, Full
Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts, 56 MICH. L. REV. 33 (1957); Sumner,
The Status of Public Acts in Sister States, 3 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1955); Note, Conflict
of Laws-Full Faith and Credit to Public Acts, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 984 (1955).
112. See, e.g., Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
113. See, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
114. In addition to the three areas referred to, it should be noted that the Su-
preme Court has held that it is a violation of the full faith and credit clause for a state
to refuse to provide a forum for a suit based upon a foreign wrongful death statute.
See First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter,
341 U.S. 609 (1951).
115. See Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965); Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S.
408 (1955); Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Alaska
Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935); Bradford Elec.
Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
116. See, e.g., Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
117. See Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S.
586 (1947); Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938);
Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925); Supreme Council of the
Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915).
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tion of the workmen's compensation act of the state where the
employment contract was entered into if the law of that state
attempted to provide an exclusive remedy."8 This was consis-
tent with the Court's early tendency to constitutionally man-
date the application of the vested rights choice of law approach
in certain situations. This rigid approach has been relaxed; the
Court has more recently held in a number of cases that even if
the employment contract was executed outside the forum, it is
constitutional for the forum to apply its law to a workmen's
compensation question if the forum has a substantial interest
in the transaction." 9
Three Supreme Court cases involving shareholder
assessments, however, present a more confused picture of the
limitations imposed by full faith and credit. Broderick v.
Rosner2" involved a bank which was incorporated in New York
and whose principal place of business was New York. An ad-
ministrative determination was made in New York that under
New York law the corporation's shareholders were subject to
assessment. New Jersey had enacted a law which barred suits
based on foreign assessment statutes, and pursuant to that law
a New Jersey court refused to hear a suit based on the New
York assessment determination. 2' The Supreme Court held
that full faith and credit required New Jersey to allow such a
suit in New Jersey.'
Broderick can be explained on the basis that either in
personam jurisdiction existed in the first proceeding due to the
shareholder's relationship with the corporation (an implied
consent notion) or that the law of the state of incorporation
must be enforced in other states pursuant to full faith and
credit.'23 If the latter interpretation of these cases is accepted,
118. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
119. See Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
120. 294 U.S. 629 (1935). Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912), involved
an analogous situation, except a judicial determination was made in the first state, as
opposed to the administrative determination made in Broderick. The Court held that
this assessment must be granted full faith and credit.
121. See generally Currie, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of
Action, 73 HARV. L. REV. 268, 286-90 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Currie].
122. 294 U.S. at 647.
123. The Court in Broderick indicated that the latter interpretation was in-
tended. 294 U.S. at 644-45. Cf. Doggrell v. Southern Box Co., 208 F.2d 310 (6th Cir.
1953) (decision by Supreme Court of Tennessee that Arkansas statute governing liabil-
ity of incorporators was penal and need not be enforced by Tennessee courts was a
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it could be argued that the subject of these cases, shareholder
assessments, is an example of one of the rare circumstances
where the need for uniform national regulation is sufficiently
critical to warrant such a limitation upon state choice of law." 4
In contrast, the Supreme Court held in Pinney v. Nelson"5
and Thomas v. Matthiessen I that a court may apply local law
which sanctions assessment of the shareholders of foreign cor-
porations, although the law of the state of incorporation pro-
scribes such assessment. These cases involved suits in Califor-
nia by California creditors against shareholders of foreign cor-
porations both of whose charters expressly authorized the cor-
poration to do business in California. California law provided
that shareholders could be personally assessed, while the laws
of the states of incorporation proscribed such liability. The
California court in both instances applied California law. The
Supreme Court upheld the decisions as being within the Con-
stitution. In two confusing opinions, the Court justified these
holdings on the ground that since the charters of both corpora-
tions expressly referred to the corporation doing business in
California, the shareholders had contracted with reference to
California law.'27 This justification is puzzling since the
corporations were incorporated elsewhere and conducted a sig-
nificant amount of business outside of California. In any event,
it appears constitutional for a forum to apply its law to ques-
tions regarding the internal affairs of a foreign corporation
when the charter of that corporation expressly authorizes the
corporation to do business in that forum.
It is difficult to reconcile an expansive reading of Broderick
with Thomas and Pinney. Unless Broderick inferentially over-
ruled Thomas and Pinney, it appears that Broderick must be
limited to its facts.' If so, it can be construed as holding that
sufficient basis for rehearing to be granted by court of appeals which affirmed district
court's holding that Tennessee courts were bound to follow the Arkansas statute.) See
generally A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICTS OF
LAWS: THE LAW OF MULTI-STATE PROBLEMS 1248-50 (1965).
124. See note 133 and accompanying text infra.
125. 183 U.S. 144 (1901).
126. 232 U.S. 221 (1914).
127. Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U.S. at 151; Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U.S. at 234-
35.
128. Professor Currie summarizes Broderick as follows:
New York had expressly declared a policy of protecting the creditors of
banks by imposing personal liability on stockholders. It has a clear inter-
est in the application of the policy to a New York bank, both for the
security of local depositors and to enhance the credit of the bank in
[Vol. 17
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when one state has an explicit substantial interest in the appli-
cation of its law and the forum has no legitimate interest in the
application of its law, the full faith and credit clause requires
the application of the former state's law. Under this view,
Broderick could clearly be distinguished from a situation
involving the application of local law to a pseudo-foreign corpo-
ration, since the forum would have a legitimate interest in the
application of its law." 9
Early cases involving fraternal benefit insurance associa-
tions held that the law of the state where the organization was
formed must be applied to questions regarding those organiza-
tions. 30 These cases have been severely limited, if not overruled
sub silencio by subsequent decisions. 131
general. New Jersey had declared no conflicting policy of protecting its
residents, as stockholders, against such liability. Neither had it suggested
any reason relating to the administration of its courts why actions to
enforce such liabilities should not be brought in New Jersey. It had only
pretended a concern for the procedural aspects of such actions . . . . In
such circumstances, New York having a legitimate governmental interest
in the application of its policy and New Jersey having none, the Court
quite properly held that New Jersey must entertain the action, and with
equal propriety intimated that New Jersey must apply the law of New
York.
B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 347 (1963).
Another commentator interpreted the case in this manner: "It is submitted that
the case of Broderick v. Rosner goes no further than to hold that a state may not deny
recovery on foreign facts when its own domestic law would award recovery on parallel
facts occurring within its own borders." Ross, "Full Faith and Credit" in a Federal
System, 20 MINN. L. REV. 140, 178 (1936). See generally Hilpert & Cooley, The Federal
Constitution and the Choice of Law, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 27, 35-36 (1939).
129. Such an interpretation would be consistent with this general statement by
the Supreme Court regarding the duty of a state to give full faith and credit to the
statutes of another state:
tTihe conflict is to be resolved not by giving automatic effect to the
full faith and credit clause compelling the court of each state to subordi-
nate its own statutes for those of the other, but by appraising the govern-
mental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the scale of decision
according to their weight. . . . Prima facie every state is entitled to
enforce in its own courts its own statutes, lawfully enacted. One who
challenges that right, because of force given to a conflicting statute of
another state by the full faith and credit clause, assumes the burden of
showing, upon some rational basis, that of the conflicting interests in-
volved those of the foreign state are superior to those of the forum.
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547-48 (1935).
130. See Order of United Commerical Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S.
586 (1947); Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1924); Supreme
Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915).
131. Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 183 (1964); Order of United
Commercial Travelers v. Duncan, 221 F.2d 703 (6th Cir. 1955). See generally Baraf,
supra note 20, at 244; Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REV.
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In light of the above, the full faith and credit clause pres-
ents no great obstacle to the circumvention of the internal af-
fairs doctrine with respect to pseudo-foreign corporations. The
cases referred to above which required the application of a
certain state's law have been limited, in all probability, to their
facts. Assuming this to be the case, full faith and credit can be
generally viewed as not requiring a state to apply a law other
than its own in situations where the application of its law
would not offend the due process clause.'32
The full faith and credit clause may impose limitations
upon state choice of law decisions in those rare situations where
the need for uniform national regulation is critical.'33 Some
commentators have suggested that the need for uniform na-
tional regulation of some of the internal affairs of pseudo-
foreign corporations is sufficiently critical that the full faith
and credit clause should be invoked.'34 These commentators
argue that chaos would result if the legality of a corporation's
dividends' or stockholders' voting rights, including acceptable
581, 596 (1953); Harper, The Supreme Court and the Conflict of Laws, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 883, 895-97 (1947); Kaplan, supra note 29, at 446; Note, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 409
(1947); Note, 33 VA. L. REV. 767 (1947); Note, 57 YALE L.J. 139 (1947).
One commentator has argued that these fraternal benefit society cases represent
attempts by the Supreme Court to protect the solvency of the financially weak frater-
nal benefit organizations. Note, 57 YALE L.J. 139, 141 (1947). Professor Baraf has
suggested that fraternal benefit organizations are distinguishable from regular
corporations regarding "the prerequisites for entry into membership, the multi-various
purposes for which organized, the pecuniary policies it must pursue and the 'non-
fraternal' procedures of 'corporate democracy.'" Baraf, supra note 20, at 244. See also
Order of United Commercial Travelers of America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947).
132. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964); Pacific Employers
Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Baraf, supra note 20, at 237-
240; Holt, Full Faith and Credit-A Suggested Approach to the Problem of Recogni-
tion of Foreign Corporations, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 453-56 (1941); Jackson, Full Faith and
Credit, the Lawyers Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 12, 27 (1945);
Kaplan, supra note 29, at 445-50; Latty I, supra note 29, at 162-66; Note, 30 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 984 (1955). See generally Reese & Kaufman, supra note 29. The similar nature
of the limitations imposed upon state choice of law by both clauses is indicated by the
fact that Justice Brandeis cited Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), a due
process decision, in support of a decision grounded upon the full faith and credit
clause. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 182 (1936).
133. See Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a
State's Choice of Law, 44 IowA L. REV. 449, 455 (1959). A state may not be required to
apply such a law, however, if the law would be obnoxious to the public policy of the
forum. See, e.g., Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 507 (1941).
134. See, e.g., Coleman, Corporate Dividends and the Conflict of Laws, 63 HARV.
L. REV. 433, 466 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Coleman]; Reese & Kaufman, supra note
29.
135. See Coleman, supra note 134; cf. Reese & Kaufman, supra note 29, at 1138
(there are some conflicts between the codes of competing states which can not be
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procedures for electing directors,"'3 were to be governed by more
than one law. Others have argued that the Supreme Court
should determine which pseudo-foreign corporate internal mat-
ters require uniform national regulation and have assumed that
the law of the state of incorporation would be applied to those
matters.' 7 It is submitted that the better view would be to
apply the law of the principal place of business of a pseudo-
foreign corporation if it were determined that such issues
should be regulated by only one state. 3 '
As noted above the Supreme Court has suggested,
expressly 3 ' or implicitly, 40 that where one state has a substan-
tial interest in the application of its law and the forum has no
legitimate interest in the application of its law, full faith and
credit must be given to the foreign law.' Pursuant to this
standard, the full faith and credit clause may bar the applica-
tion of the law of the state of incorporation on certain questions
dealing with pseudo-foreign corporations, since the state of in-
corporation would have little interest in applying its law vis-a-
vis the interest of the principal place of business of the corpora-
tion.
Professors Reese and Kaufman suggest that three factors
should be considered in determining whether the full faith and
credit clause requires another state to apply the law of the state
of incorporation to a question involving the internal affairs of
a corporation with multi-state contacts: (1) the corporation's
connection with the state; (2) the intensity of the state interest
involved; (3) the intensity of the need for regulation of the
matters by a single law. 4 2 Such an approach may require
psychic powers to determine "the intensity of the state interest
involved."' 43 However, if a corporation has a substantial
resolved by the application of the stricter standard).
136. Reese & Kaufman, supra note 29, at 1141.
137. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 669 (1974).
138. See Coleman, supra note 134, at 466; cf. Reese & Kaufman, supra note 29,
at 1143 (full faith and credit is thought to require application of the law of the state of
incorporation except where another state has a great interest of its own to protect).
139. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547
(1935).
140. Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
141. See Currie, supra note 121, at 290. See also Aldens, Inc. v. Packel, 524 F.2d
38 (6th Cir. 1975). The court in Aldens stated that the full faith and credit clause
requires a court to apply the law of a sister state "when ... a sister state has a greater
interest in regulating the transaction." Id. at 44.
142. See Reese & Kaufman, supra note 29, at 1134.
143. See generally Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmen-
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connection with a forum, the forum should be able to apply its
law to a question regarding the internal affairs of a foreign
corporation unless the need for regulation by a single law in
that instance is critical.
Experience has shown that it is not critical that all ques-
tions regarding the internal affairs of a corporation be governed
by the laws of one state.'" For example, almost fifteen years
tal Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Cm. L. REV. 9 (1958); Nutting, Suggested
Limitations of Public Policy Doctrine, 19 MINN. L. REV. 196 (1935).
144. Civil law countries, for example, reject the view that the law of the place of
incorporation governs a corporation's internal affairs. See generally Latty I, supra note
29, at 167 n.134. Courts in those countries apply the law either of the "social seat"
(le sikge social), sometimes referred to as the real seat (la si~ge reel), or the principal
place of business (le centre d'exploitation) to questions regarding the internal affairs
of a corporation. See generally A. FARNSWORTH, THE RESIDENCE AND DOMICILE OF
CORPORATIONS (1939); Conard, Organizing for Business, in AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET-A LEGAL PROFILE 1, 61-65 (E. Stein & T. Nicholson eds.
1960); Stein, Conflict of Laws Rules by Treaty: Recognition of Companies in a Regional
Market, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 1327, 1332-36 (1970); Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise,
A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 HARV. L. REV. 740 (1970); Note, The
Nationality of International Corporations Under Civil Law and Treaty, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 1429 (1961). Most Western European countries, with the exception of the Nether-
lands, adhere to the "social seat" doctrine. See 2 E. RABEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
33-35 (2d ed. 1960).
The French were apparently prompted to adopt this conflict of laws rule at least
in part as a result of England's relatively lax corporation laws in the 19th century.
French businesses apparently became chartered in England and then conducted busi-
ness in France. See Latty I, supra note 29, at 166 n.130.
The place of central administration of a corporation is its "social seat"; the princi-
pal factors considered in the determination of a corporation's social seat are where its
executive offices are located and where its shareholders' and directors' meetings are
held. See Hadari, The Choice of National Law Applicable to the Multi-National Enter-
prise and the Nationality of Such Enterprises, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1, 7; Latty I, supra note
29, at 167 n.136. The social seat cannot be ficticious and must be the actual center of
the enterprise. Latty I, supra note 29, at 170 n.151. It is possible, however, to establish
a social seat (e.g., a main office and shareholders' and directors' meetings) in any
jurisdiction where there are significant contacts with the corporation. See 2 RABEL,
CONFLICT OF LAWS, 44-45 (1947); Latty I, supra note 29, at 171 n.152. A number of
commentators have argued that a corporation's apparent social seat should be honored
only if there is a business reason for establishing the social seat in that jurisdiction.
See generally R. PENNINGTON, COMPANIES IN THE COMMON MARKET (2d ed. 1970); Latty
I, supra note 29, at 170.
The location of a corporation's social seat is somewhat unclear if its executive
offices and shareholders' and directors' meetings are not in the same jurisdiction. For
example, Chandora v. Fondateurs et Administrateurs de la Banque Europeene, Tri-
bunal Correctionnel de Ia Seine, Feb. 10, 1881, 8 Clunet 158 (France 1881), involved a
bank incorporated in Belgium whose shareholders' and directors' meetings were held
in Belgium and whose executive offices were in France. The bank had a "considerable
number" of employees in Belgium and it invested a substantial percentage of its
resources in Belgian companies. The court there held that the corporation's social seat
was Belgium. Latty I, supra note 29, at 168. Applying the law of a corporation's social
seat to matters regarding its internal affairs has generally been a workable approach.
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ago New York enacted a law which is analogous to section
2115, and this law has not generated a significant number of
problems. It does not seem, therefore, that it would be neces-
sary to establish a constitutionally mandated uniform rule re-
garding the matters regulated by the New York statute.'45
The Commerce Clause
It could be argued that section 2115 violates the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution'46 since the Supreme
Court has struck down state regulations which place too great
a burden on interstate commerce. For example, when compli-
ance with one state's safety regulations regarding mudflaps
would have been illegal in another state, the Court struck down
the former state's statute as an unreasonable restraint upon
commerce.'47 In addition, the Court has struck down a state
statute which prescribed the maximum length of trains in that
state.'48
It is doubtful that section 2115 could be successfully chal-
lenged as an excessive burden upon interstate commerce. An
unanimous Court recently stated that a state regulation which
affects interstate commerce will be reviewed in this manner:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effec-
tuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a
legitimate local purpose is found, then the question be-
comes one of degree, and the extent of the burden that will
See generally 2 E. RABEL, supra; Latty I, supra note 29, at 166-72; Vagts, The Multina-
tional Enterprise, supra; Note, The Nationality of International Corporations Under
Civil Law and Treaty, supra.
145. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1315-1320 (McKinney 1963). New York pseudo-
foreign corporations are subject to the following provisions of the New York corpora-
tions code: section 1315 (the release of a list of shareholders to a shareholder upon
demand); section 1316 (voting trust records); section 719, except subsection (a)(3)
thereof (liability of directors); section 720 (actions against a director or officer for
misconduct); section 1318 (disclosing certain specified information to shareholders);
section 623 (the enforcement of dissenters' rights); section 626 (the right of a share-
holder to bring a derivative action); section 627 (security for expenses in a derivative
action); sections 721-27 (indemnification of directors and officers); and section 907
(merger of domestic and foreign corporations). See also N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1315-
19 (McKinney 1963).
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
147. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
148. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
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be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local
interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as
well with a lesser impact on interstate activities. Occasion-
ally, the Court has candidly undertaken a balancing ap-
proach in resolving these issues, but more frequently it has
spoken in terms of "direct" and "indirect" effects and bur-
dens."'
California could not promote its substantial state interest em-
bodied in section 2115 in another manner which would have "a
lesser impact on interstate activities" and it is unclear what is
required to constitute more than an "incidental" effect upon
interstate commerce.
Professor Dowling has suggested that a state regulation
will be struck down when its burden upon commerce exceeds
it local benefits.110 The Court has recently struck down state
statutes as unreasonable burdens on interstate commerce only
when they found that the burden was substantial and the local
benefits minimal or nonexistent.'5 ' In addition, the Court has
generally upheld those state statutes which further local health
or safety or protect local citizens from fraud 5 ' and which do not
discriminate against interstate commerce vis-a-vis local com-
merce.'53 Since the local benefits which will flow from section
2115 are substantial and since one of its purposes is to protect
California shareholders and creditors from fraud, it is highly
149. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). See generally Southern
Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
150. See Aldens, Inc. v. Packel, 524 F.2d 38, 46 (3d Cir. 1975); see generally
Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1 (1940).
151. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern Pac.
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
152. See H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
153. See Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361 (1964);
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). See generally Cowett, Reorganization,
Consolidations, Mergers and Related Corporate Events Under the Blue Sky Laws, 13
Bus. LAW 760 (1958); Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REv.
1 (1940); Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised Version, 47 COLUM.
L. REV. 547 (1947).
It should be noted that the Court held that the various state blue sky laws were
constitutional exercises of the police powers of the respective states, and not unreason-
able burdens upon interstate commerce. See, e.g., Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S.
539 (1917).
Some commentators have suggested that state statutes regulating certain activi-
ties of foreign corporations would unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce. See
Cowett, Reorganizations, Consolidations, Mergers, and Related Corporate Events
Under the Blue Sky Laws, 13 Bus. LAW. 760 (1958); Comment, Commerce Clause
Limitations upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1134 (1974).
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doubtful that a court will find that section 2115 violates the
commerce clause.
In light of the above, it appears that the most serious con-
stitutional challenge to section 2115 is that it may violate the
rule of Home Insurance Co. v. Dick in certain situations. Oth-
erwise, the contacts which must exist under section 2115(a)
before California law will be applied to a foreign corporation's
internal affairs are clearly sufficient to satisfy the requirements
of the due process, full faith and credit, and commerce clauses.
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 2115
The Resolution of Conflicts Between Section 2115 and the
Laws of Other States
The effect of most of the requirements enumerated in sec-
tion 2115 (b) will be only to require pseudo-foreign corporations
to establish additional procedures or to obtain shareholder
approval in an increased number of situations; actual conflict
between the laws of the respective states should be rare. For
example, it would be advisable for officers of a pseudo-foreign
corporation to permit shareholder inspection when the claims
of a shareholder meet the requirements of either the California
code or the law of the state of incorporation. Similarly, a cor-
poration should satisfy the approval requirements of both the
new code and those of the state of incorporation before effecting
a proposed reorganization, and appraisal rights should be
granted to any shareholder given such rights by the law of
either state. Dividend distributions and indemnification of
directors and officers should only be made if the protective
requirements of both California and the law of the state of
incorporation are satisfied. A director should behave in a man-
ner consonant with the highest standard of care prescribed in
either the California code or the law of the state of incorpora-
tion. And, of course, the corporation should cumulate votes at
any election of directors, and such elections should be held
annually for all directors.
The most onerous type of conflict which might result from
a regulatory scheme such as section 2115 would be a situation
where the law of the state of incorporation mandates certain
behavior proscribed by the new California code, or vice versa.
A potentially significant conflict of this type which could arise
under section 2115 stems from the regulation of dividend distri-
butions of pseudo-foreign corporations. The codes of certain
states may, in the future, provide that a shareholder can com-
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pel a dividend distribution in certain situations.' 4 If any such
mandatory distributions would be prohibited by the California
code, a serious conflict could result. It is unlikely that any
current mandatory dividend provisions give rise to such a con-
flict at this time.'55 However, if such a conflict should arise,
artifice should bow to reality; the law of the state which has
the most significant contacts with the pseudo-foreign corpora-
tion should be applied.'
Enforcement of Section 2115
If a pseudo-foreign corporation is unwilling to comply vol-
untarily with the provisions enumerated in section 2115(b),
shareholders of such a corporation generally could insure com-
pliance through an action in a California court. Obviously it
would be possible to obtain a judgment and an affirmative
order regarding the activities of a pseudo-foreign corporation in
California and regarding those officers and directors of the cor-
poration present in California. However, the degree to which
these California judgments and orders would be entitled to full
faith and credit in other states is unclear.'57 It is clear that a
154. North Carolina is the only state with such a provision now in effect. See
N.C. GEN. STATS. ANN. § 55-50 (Supp. 1975).
The corporations codes of most states now provide that dividend distributions are
discretionary. In these states a court will compel a dividend distribution only if it is
shown that the directors are acting either in bad faith or clearly unreasonably. See
Leibert v. Grinnell Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 340, 194 A.2d 846 (1963); Farmers Warehouse of
Pelham, Inc. v. Collins, 220 Ga. 141, 137 S.E.2d 619 (1964); Cashman v. Petrie, 14
N.Y.2d 426, 201 N.E.2d 24, 252 N.Y.S.2d 447 (1964).
155. No mandatory distribution ordered pursuant to the North Carolina provi-
sion would be proscribed by the California code. The North Carolina provision provides
for the mandatory distribution of one-third of a corporation's "net profits" for the
preceding fiscal year in certain circumstances. In California, section 500(a) generally
authorizes any distribution made from the retained earnings of a corporation. 1976 Cal.
Legis. Serv., ch. 641, § 14, at 1644 (amending CAL. Coap. CODE § 500(a)). Regarding
other mandatory dividend provisions which have been repealed, see generally Malone
v. Armor Insulating Co., 131 Ga. 146, 12 S.E.2d 299 (1940); Rubens v. Marion-
Washington Realty Corp., 116 Ind. App. 55, 59 N.E.2d 907 (1945); Koppel v. Middle
States Petroleum Corp., 272 App. Div. 790, 69 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1947); Cannon v. Wiscas-
sett Mills Co., 195 N.C. 119, 141 S.E. 344 (1928).
156. For further discussion of the burdens imposed by section 2115(b) upon
pseudo-foreign corporations, see Comment, The Pseudo-Foreign Corporation in
California, 28 HASTINGS L. J. 119, 132 (1976).
157. See generally Moore & Oglebay, The Supreme Court and Full Faith and
Credit, 29 VA. L. REV. 557 (1943); Page, Full Faith and Credit, 1948 Wis. L. REV. 265;
Paulsen, Enforcing the Money Judgment of a Sister State, 42 IOWA L. REV. 202 (1957);
Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REV.
153 (1949); [hereinafter cited as Reese & Johnson]; Sumner, The Full Faith and
Credit Clause-Its History and Purpose, 34 ORE. L. REV. 224 (1955); Sumner, Full
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valid, nonmodifiable,' 5 final'55 California judgment 0 on the
merits generally would be entitled to full faith and credit.' 6'
Other states may not refuse to recognize such a judgment on
the basis that the judgment offends its public policy;' 2 the only
generally accepted ground for not granting full faith and credit
to such a judgment is that the judgment is rendered without
jurisdiction.' 3 California judgments rendered in connection
Faith and Credit for Judicial Proceedings, 2 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 441 (1955); Yntema, The
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law, 33 MICH. L. REV. 1129
(1935). It should be noted that the Supreme Court has held that a judgment may not
be entitled to full faith and credit when both parties are corporations. See Anglo-
American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U.S. 373 (1903).
158. See, e.g., Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947); Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S.
183 (1901). Judgments which remain subject to modification in the rendering state
have not been deemed entitled to full faith and credit. See generally A. EHRENZWEIO,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 269-80 (1962); Kelso, Reciprocal Enforcement of Support: 1958
Dimensions, 43 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1959); Note, Interstate Enforcement of Modifiable
Alimony and Child Support Decrees, 54 IOWA L. REV. 597 (1966); Note, Uniform Recip-
rocal Enforcement of Support Act, 13 STAN. L. REV. 901 (1961). The law of the
rendering state governs the question whether a judgment is "modifiable." See, e.g.,
Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944).
159. A judgment generally lacks "finality" if further judicial action by the court
rendering the judgment is required to resolve the matter litigated. See generally Note,
The Finality of Judgments in the Conflict of Laws, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 878 (1941).
Appeals, stays, and interlocutory orders may affect the finality of a judgment. Id. The
law of the rendering state governs the question of finality. See Paine v. Schnectady
Ins. Co., 11 R.I. 411 (1876).
160. Declaratory judgments as well as equity decrees, except possibly those de-
crees ordering an extrastate act or forbearance, and those decrees purporting to affect
title to extrastate land or personal status, such as custody of a child (see A. EHREN-
ZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 182-83 (1962)), constitute "judicial proceedings" entitled to
full faith and credit. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 76 (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1973); Note, The Res Judicata Effect of Declaratory Relief in the Federal Courts,
46 S. CAL. L. REV. 803 (1973).
161. See, e.g., Sumner, Full Faith and Credit for Judicial Proceedings, 2
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 441 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Sumner].
162. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
163. See, e.g., Sumner, supra note 161. If the question of personal jurisdiction
was litigated in the first proceeding, the first adjudication is res judicata regarding that
issue, unless the state where the judgment was rendered would permit subsequent
collateral attack. See, e.g., American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932);
Baldwin v. Iowa State Travelling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931); Vander v. Casper-
son, 12 N.Y.2d 56, 236 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1962). It is unclear whether the subject matter
jurisdiction of the rendering court may be collaterally attacked if the issue was raised
in the initial proceeding. Compare Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963) with Kalb v.
Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940) and Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938). See generally
Boskey & Braucher, Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 1006 (1940);
Dobbs, The Validation of Void Judgments: The Bootstrap Principle, 53 VA. L. REv.
1003 (1967).
The argument has been made that full faith and credit should not be granted to
judgments in certain situations where a competing national policy overrides the policy
justifications for full faith and credit. See Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 611 (1958)
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with the provisions of section 2115 would not fall within the
scope of "penal judgments" to which a second state arguably
may refuse full faith and credit.'64
It is unclear whether a state must grant full faith and
credit to an extraterritorial affirmative order given by a Cali-
fornia court in connection with the California judgment.' 5
Such a remedy may be necessary, for example, if a pseudo-
foreign California corporation held its shareholders' meeting in
a state other than California and did not permit cumulative
voting in the election of its directors. A shareholder either
would have to bring suit in California and attempt to obtain
an extraterritorial order or bring suit in the state where the
shareholders' meeting was being held in order to attempt to
enforce section 708, the provision which provides that cumula-
tive voting is mandatory. Since it is doubtful that another state
would apply California law to the question of mandatory cumu-
lative voting, especially if that state were the state of incorpo-
ration,' 6 a shareholder most likely would pursue the former
procedure and obtain an extraterritorial order from a California
court.' 7
(dissenting opinion); Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 620 (1947) (concurring opinion);
Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 215 (1933) (dissenting opinion); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 103, Comment b (1971). See generally Reese & John-
son, supra note 157. But see Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last
Appeal for Its Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1230, 1240 (1965); Note, Full Faith and
Credit to Judgments: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement Second, 54 CALIF. L.
REv. 282 (1966). This alleged exception to full faith and credit has only been advanced
regarding cases involving divorce or child custody. Id. It does not appear that granting
full faith and credit to judgments involving pseudo-foreign corporations will similarly
conflict with crucial state and national policies.
164. The Supreme Court has stated that this basis for refusing to grant full faith
and credit, if it is available at all, is limited to those judgments regarding offenses
against the state or the public at large, as opposed to those resulting from private or
individual action. See Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935);
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892). The Supreme Court has held, for example,
that a judgment resulting from a private suit involving the liability of directors and
shareholders of a corporation does not constitute a "penal judgment." Id.
165. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963); Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909).
See generally A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 182-83 (1962); Paulsen, Enforcing the
Money Judgment of a Sister State, 42 IOWA L. REv. 202 (1957); Reese, Full Faith and
Credit to Foreign Equity Decrees, 42 IOWA L. Rxv. 183 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
Reese]; Reese & Johnson, supra note 157; Sumner, supra note 161; Yntema, The
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American Law, 33 MICH. L. REv. 1129
(1935).
166. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 121(b) (Cum. Supp. 1968), which provides
that every Delaware corporation shall be governed by the Delaware corporations code.
167. An analogous situation would result, for example, if a corporation refused a
shareholder's request to inspect certain records of the corporation stored outside of
California pursuant to his inspection rights as provided in section 1605.
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A substantial amount of the uncertainty regarding the
degree to which extraterritorial affirmative orders must be
given full faith and credit in other states stems from the case
of Fall v. Eastin. '" In that case, a Washington court with per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant ordered him to convey
Nebraska land to his wife. The defendant left Washington be-
fore complying with the decree. The Washington court then
ordered a statutory officer to execute a deed regarding the Ne-
braska land. In the wife's suit thereafter to quiet title, the
Supreme Court held (in a very confusing opinion) that the
Washington deed was invalid and refused to require full faith
and credit for the Washington decree, even though the Court
acknowledged that the Washington court possessed personal
jurisdiction. Professor Currie suggests that the case should be
interpreted to mean that a decree should be accorded full faith
and credit, but that an attempted state commissioner's deed
regarding foreign land is invalid."9 A number of state courts
have held that decrees regarding foreign land are entitled to
full faith and credit. 7 ' Furthermore, Professor Reese suggests
that certain types of equity decrees should always be entitled
to full faith and credit. 7 ' He suggests that decrees which either
order the payment of money or create, affect or destroy a status
should be entitled to full faith and credit.'
In addition to the cases involving orders to convey foreign
land, the question of the extraterritorial effect of other types of
decrees has arisen in cases involving injunctions either against
bringing suit or enforcing a judgment.' For example, injunc-
tions have been obtained regarding the enforcement of a judg-
ment fraudulently procured in another jurisdiction. When the
168. 215 U.S. 1 (1909); See generally Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign
Land Decrees, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 620 (1954).
169. Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. CHI. L. REV.
620, 639-40 (1954). This distinction is somewhat undermined by the fact that the Court
in Fall disapproved of Burnley v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St. 474 (1873), a case which
granted full faith and credit to a foreign land decree and ignored the deed issued in
connection therewith. 215 U.S. at 12-14.
170. See Varone v. Varone, 359 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1966); Rozan v. Rozan, 49 Cal.
2d 322, 330-32, 317 P.2d 11, 15-16 (1957); Zorick v. Jones, 193 So. 2d 420 (Miss. 1966);
Weesner v. Weesner, 168 Neb. 346, 95 N.W.2d 682 (1959); Higginbotham v. Higgin-
botham, 92 N.J. Super. 18, 222 A.2d 120 (1966). But see Rozan v. Rozan, 129 N.W.2d
694 (N.D. 1964); McRary v. McRary, 228 N.C. 714, 47 S.E.2d 27 (1948).
171. See Reese, supra note 165.
172. Id. at 192. Professor Reese also suggests granting full faith and credit to
other types of decrees in certain situations. Id. at 196.
173. Id. at 196.
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plaintiff has attempted to enforce such a judgment in the ren-
dering state subsequent to the issuance of the injunction in the
foreign state, the rendering state has granted full faith and
credit to the injunction promulgated by the foreign state and
has refused to enforce its own judgment.'74 Similarly, if the
foreign court should find that the judgment was not procured
fraudulently, such a finding would also be entitled to full faith
and credit.'75
Courts have also enjoined a defendant from bringing suit
in another state.7 ' Such an injunction generally is sought either
on the grounds of forum non conveniens or that the threatened
suit would generate a multiplicity of actions.'77 Courts have
almost uniformly refused to grant full faith and credit to such
injunctions.'7 8 Professor Reese contends that it would consti-
tute a "forbidden infringement of some legitimate domestic
interest of a state to require it to give full faith and credit to
such an injunction."' 79 Although most commentators agree that
such injunctions should not be granted full faith and credit in
a foreign state, a minority of commentators argue that such
judicial proceedings are so entitled.'8 ° Even if such injunctions
are not entitled to full faith and credit, of course, a person who
violates such an injunction could be punished for contempt in
the rendering state.
The Effect of Foreign Judgments on Section 2115
Provisions of section 2115 might be circumvented pursuant
to a judgment obtained in another state. If a bona fide case or
controversy regarding a California pseudo-foreign corporation
was adjudicated in a court in another state, and if that court
174. See, e.g., Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N.Y. 156 (1854).
175. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Gaston, Williams & Wigmore, 13 F.2d 267
(S.D.N.Y. 1926).
176. See generally Reese, supra note 165, at 197.
177. Id.; Rogers, Injunctions Against Suits in Foreign Jurisdictions, 10 LA. L.
REV. 302 (1950).
178. See, e.g., James v. Grand Trunk W.R.R., 14 Ill. 2d 356, 152 N.E.2d 858
(1958). See generally Ginsburg, Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The
Last-in-Time Rule for Conflicting Judgments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 798, 823-30 (1969);
Reese, supra note 165; Comment, Forum Non Conveniens, Injunctions Against Suit
and Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 740 (1962); Comment, Full Faith and
Credit to Foreign Injunctions, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 633 (1959).
179. Reese, supra note 165, at 198.
180. See, e.g., Ginsburg, Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The
Last-in-Time Rule for Conflicting Judgments, 82 HAsv. L. REV. 798, 823-30 Comment,
Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Injunctions, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 633 (1959).
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applied the law of a state other than California, section 2115
would be circumvented if California were required to give full
faith and credit to such an adjudication.'' It is uncertain
whether courts of other jurisdictions will apply section 2115 to
the internal affairs of California pseudo-foreign corporations.
The failure of such a court to apply section 211582 may violate
the full faith and credit clause, if the state whose law is applied
has no legitimate interest in the application of its law. If that
court applied other than California law, however, and that
application did not violate the full faith and credit clause, a
question would arise whether the adjudication must be granted
full faith and credit by a California court.
It was suggested in the preceding section that full faith and
credit generally must be granted to nonmodifiable final judg-
ments on the merits.8 ' If such a judgment were rendered by a
foreign court regarding a California pseudo-foreign corporation,
then, such a judgment generally would be entitled to full faith
and credit; the choice of law determination in the original pro-
ceeding usually is not considered subject to collateral attack.
However, certain policy exceptions have evolved regarding the
extent to which such judgments are entitled to full faith and
credit.
It has been suggested that in certain special situations a
judgment which is valid under the due process clause may not
be entitled to full faith and credit because of the particular
interests of the forum state.'84 In Williams v. North Carolina'85
a man and a woman, each North Carolina domiciliaries, left
their respective spouses and went to Nevada. There they insti-
tuted divorce proceedings and a Nevada court found that they
were Nevada domiciliaries and granted a divorce decree. The
couple then married and returned to North Carolina where
they were prosecuted for bigamy and found guilty. The Su-
preme Court held that the Nevada judgment did not have to
be granted full faith and credit by the state of original marital
domicile. "8 Although it is far from certain, the case suggests
181. Such a situation could result, for example, if a director violated the stan-
dard of care for a director prescribed by the new code but did not violate the standard
of care prescribed by the law of the state of incorporation.
182. See text accompanying notes 125-27 supra.
183. See note 158 & accompanying text supra; Reese & Johnson, supra note 157.
184. Reese & Johnson, supra note 157, at 169.
185. 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
186. Id. at 239.
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that even though an initial judgment satisfies due process re-
quirements, it still may not be entitled to full faith and credit
if the interests of the state in which it is sued upon are suffi-
ciently great."7 Although section 2115 might be circumvented
by a final judgment on the merits rendered in another state,
the substantial interests of California regarding such a corpora-
tion or the substantial national policy regarding uniform na-
tional regulation of pseudo-foreign corporations should over-
ride the policy considerations in favor of granting full faith and
credit to foreign judgments.
It should also be noted that a suit could be filed in the
state of incorporation of a California pseudo-foreign corpora-
tion in order to attempt to obtain an injunction against prose-
cuting an action in California. If such an injunction were ren-
dered, although it would not be entitled to full faith and credit,
a party could be imprisoned for contempt by the court in the
state of incorporation if the party was before that court and the
party continued to prosecute an action in California.' 8 Con-
versely, a party could bring an action in a California court to
attempt to enjoin another party from prosecuting an action in
a court in the state of incorporation.'
187. According to Reese & Johnson:
Speaking for the majority, Justice Frankfurter was explicit in stating that
this result was not based upon the invalidity under due process of the
divorce decree, but that instead "If this Court finds that proper weight
was accorded to the claims of power by the courts of one State in render-
ing a judgment the validity of which is pleaded in defense in another
State . . . and that a finding adverse to the necessary foundation for any
valid sister-State judgment was amply supported in evidence, we cannot
upset the judgment before us. And we cannot do so even if we also found
in the record of the court of original judgment warrant for its finding that
it had jurisdiction. [William v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. at 234.]" The
reason he gave was this: "But those not parties to a litigation ought not
to be foreclosed by the interested actions of others; especially not a State
which is concerned with the vindication of its own social policy. . . . The
State of domiciliary origin should not be bound by an unfounded, even
if not collusive, recital in the record of a court of another State. [Id. at
230 (italics supplied).]"
In short, the basis of the decision is that even though the divorce
decree may have been valid under due process, it still was not entitled
to full faith and credit in North Carolina because of the interest of the
latter state "in the family relation of its own people." [Id. at 232].
Reese & Johnson, supra note 157, at 169. It has also been suggested that judgments
will not be entitled to full faith and credit in those situations where a competing
national policy is more compelling. See Reese & Johnson, supra note 157, at 178.
188. See Platt v. Woodruff, 61 N.Y. 378 (1875).
189. See generally Comment, Jurisdiction of Forum to Enjoin Contempt Pro-
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The Responses of Other States to Section 2115
Section 2115 extends to foreign corporations if more than
fifty percent of its shares, excluding those held in street name,
are held by persons "having addresses" in California, and if the
average of its property, payroll and sales factors in California
exceeds fifty percent. The fifty percent minimums, as well as
the two-prong nature of the section 2115 test, will insure that
California will have the most substantial contacts with all cor-
porations governed by section 2115.
Critics of section 2115 have predicted that other states will
enact statutes in retaliation to section 2115, presumably with
provisions allowing them to acquire jurisdiction over the inter-
nal affairs of foreign corporations on the basis of fewer contacts
than are required under section 2115, thereby causing the law
governing the internal affairs of a corporation to become in-
creasingly uncertain. Even if other states enact provisions simi-
lar to section 2115, but set forth a different type of test for the
provision, an overlap with section 2115 could result."" If the
overlap should be substantial, or if states should begin to enact
retaliatory statutes, it would appear that the minimum percen-
tage of one or both aspects of the section 2115(a) test could be
increased without substantially undermining the purpose of
the provision. Such an increase would reduce any overlap as
well as assuage the belligerence of sister states.
CONCLUSIONS
Section 2115 encroaches upon the cherished legal concept
that a corporation "exists" in its state of incorporation.' It is
submitted, however, that the policy justifications discussed
above for section 2115 warrant the severance of the conceptual
umbilical tie between a pseudo-foreign corporation and its
state of incorporation. 9 ' It is not questioned that the internal
ceeding on Foreign Decree Enjoining Prosecution of Lawsuit Within State of Forum,
46 HARV. L. REV. 1030 (1933); Comment, Forum Non Conveniens in Minnesota, 31
MICH. L. REV. 963 (1933); Comment, Extraterritorial Recognition of Injunctions
Against Suit, 39 YALE L.J. 719 (1930).
190. For example, certain sections of the New York corporations code govern a
foreign corporation if one-half of its business income for the preceding three fiscal years
was allocable to New York. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1320(2) (McKinney 1963).
191. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882). See generally Fead,
Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations, 24 MICH. L. REv. 633 (1926).
192. Since it could be argued that the provisions enumerated in section 2115(b)
represent fundamental public policies of California, section 2115 can also be character-
ized as an example of the traditional exception to general state choice of law rules: a
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affairs doctrine is both simple and consistent. The application
of this doctrine to pseudo-foreign corporations, however, results
in regulating its activities, to the detriment of the state in
which the corporation derives a majority of its revenue and in
which a majority of its shareholders reside. Section 2115 re-
solves this anomaly. It represents a significant step by Califor-
nia to regain control of corpoiations whose principal place of
business is within the state. Laws which reflect a substantial
public policy of California will thereby begin to govern many
more corporations whose principal place of business is in Cali-
fornia.
forum will not apply a law of another state that violates a fundamental public policy
of the forum. Of course, section 2115 is somewhat different in that it applies only to
corporations with a certain level of contacts with California.
